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Comments
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: A BENCHMARK FOR
EVALUATING DEFENSIVE TACTICS IN THE STORM
OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A wave of corporate takeovers has engulfed the United States with a
new intensity in the 1980s.1 In 1985 alone, 3,165 mergers occurred involving 139.1 billion dollars in assets.2 Along with the increase in merg1. For a general discussion of the increase in merger activity, see Matheson
& Norberg, Hostile Share Acquisitions and Corporate Governance: A Framework For
EvaluatingAntitakeover Activities, 47 U. PITr. L. REV. 407, 411-12 (1986) (presenting statistics on surge in takeover activity from 1975 through 1984); see also Top
25 Transactions, appearing in quarterly issues of MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS.
Economists have categorized mergers throughout the years in different time
frames. S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON & J. MCCARTHY, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW

413 (1981). The first wave of mergers occurred between 1895 and 1904, converting a number of enterprises into near monopolies, and so has been charac-

terized as a period of "mergers for monopoly." Id. at 410, 413. Mergers during
the second period, from 1920 to 1929, have been called "mergers for oligopoly." Id. at 413. An oligopoly is a market in which there are few sellers and an
increase or decrease in the output of one seller appreciably affects the market
price. Id. at 277 (citing Wilcox, Competition and Monopoly in American Industry,
TNEC Monograph No. 21 (1941)). During this period, the monopolistic firms
created during the first wave of mergers had declined, and mergers occurred
between "second class" or smaller companies, tending to transform industries

into oligopolies. Id. Following World War II, a third wave of mergers occurred,
known as conglomerate mergers, because they involved corporations in different
industries. Id. at 413 (citing SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 123 (2d ed. 1980)). The next period of intense mergers
occurred from 1966 to 1970. Id. at 412. Once again, most of these mergers
involved corporations from two unrelated industries. Id. at 413.
Merger activity has intensified in recent years. From 1979 through 1984,
there were 16,285 mergers involving 510.9 billion dollars in assets. 1985 Profile,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1986, at 45. The dollar value of takeover

transactions from 1983 to 1984 alone increased 139%, from $61.9 billion to
$142 billion. Matheson & Norberg, supra, at 411-12. The number of tender
offers for the same period also increased dramatically, from 77 in 1983 to 142 in
1984. Id.
2. 1985 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1986, at 45. Corporations attempt to acquire other corporations for many reasons. First, the potential acquiror may believe that it can increase the profits of the target by replacing
the target's management. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1030-31 (1982) (discussing replacement of
management as motive for takeover); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169-

73 (1981) (same); E.

KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGER

18-19 (1983)

(discussing shortage of capable management as factor in merger movement).
The acquiring corporation often owns a large percentage of the target's stock

(1439)
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ers has come an increase in the defensive mechanisms employed by
corporate directors to prevent their corporations from being the targets
3
of takeovers by undesirable suitors.
and, therefore, stands to benefit greatly from the increased profits resulting
from a change in management. Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 870-73 (1981).
There are two prevailing reasons why a change in management may increase the
profits of the target. As one commentator suggests, a major problem with today's corporations is a dearth of competent management. E. KINTNER, supra, at
18-19. The acquiror can replace the target's management with highly-trained,
experienced managers who can develop and maintain sound corporate programs that will increase profitability. Id. New management may also concentrate more on increasing the viability of the target instead of pursuing interests
outside of the corporation. Bebchuk, supra, at 1031 & n.18.
A second reason a corporation may seek to acquire another corporation is
to reduce its production and marketing costs by enlarging its scale of operation.
E. KINTNER, supra, at 18. By distributing the acquiring corporation's fixed costs
over a broader base, namely the acquiring corporation and its target, the acquiring corporation can reduce the amount of the total cost for each unit sold which
is attributable to the fixed costs. Id.
Third, management of an acquiring corporation may take over a target corporation in order to diversify and, thus, maintain corporate stability. E. KINTNER, supra, at 19. If the profit of the acquiring corporation is cyclical or based on
the strength of the economy, it may seek to merge with a corporation whose
profits do not fluctuate as frequently. Id. The acquiring corporation may also
merge in order to avoid going out of business if, for instance, its current product
line is no longer marketable. Id.
Fourth, managers may seek to expand the size of their corporations because
increased income and prestige are customarily associated with large conglomerates. Bebchuk, supra, at 1033; see also W. BAUMAL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE
AND GROWTH 45-52 (rev. ed. 1967); R. MARRIS, THE EcONOMIc THEORY OF MANAGEMENT CAPITALISM 46-109 (1964). Although managers have an incentive to

expand their corporate domain, empirical studies have illustrated that the acquiring corporations often lose money as a result of mergers. Nodd & Ruback,
Tender Offers and Stockholders Returns, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 397-98 (1977). For a
discussion of other negative aspects of a takeover and the resulting merger, see
infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
Additionally, corporations may seek to take over another corporation for
other reasons. For instance, a corporation may want to assure uninterrupted
access to raw materials and market outlets. S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON &J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 417. A corporation may also want to acquire new technology or research capacity. Id. Finally, a corporation may want to expand
rapidly through an acquisition, as opposed to the slower growth which generally
is associated with internal growth. Id. For a discussion of other reasons for allowing and encouraging takeovers, see Morrissey, Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers-Does Anything Go?, 53 TENN. L. REV. 103, 111-19 (1985).
3. Note, CorporationsMay Exclude Raiders from Defensive Self-Tender Offers in
Warding Off Hostile Takeovers-Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985), 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 301, 301 (1986). The defensive strategies
employed by directors of targets to discourage hostile tender offers and the participants in the takeover struggle themselves have been dubbed with colorful
names. The acquiring corporation that makes the tender offer is referred to as a
corporate "raider." "Golden parachute" is the label for termination agreements
given by corporations to certain managers and directors which provide substantial bonuses and other benefits to these employees if a raider successfully takes
over the target. See, e.g., Brown v. Ferro Corp., 763 F.2d 798, 802-03 (6th Cir.
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This comment will discuss and evaluate recent court decisions regarding the legitimacy of three defensive mechanisms employed by corporations to ward off unwanted takeover attempts: discretionary selftender, poison pill and lock-up option. 4 A "discretionary self-tender"
describes the situation in which the target's directors offer to purchase
the shares of its shareholders, save those of the tender offeror, at a
1985) (rejecting shareholder derivative suit on grounds that corporation incurred no damage from escrow created to fund officers' severance agreement);

see also Profusek, Bober &Johnson, An Overview of Current Basic Takeover Planning,
14 SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 228-29 (1986) (noting typical terms of golden parachute

agreements). A "white knight" is the friendly corporation with which a target
corporation arranges to merge in order to avoid being taken over by a raider.
See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980) (raider
did not meet burden of proving improper purpose or corporate waste by target
when it issued shares to white knight so as to dilute raider's interest in target). A
"lock-up option" is an arrangement under which a target agrees to sell part of its
assets to a friendly suitor if the raider obtains control of the target. See, e.g.,
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir.
1986) (target corporation granted white knight option to purchase two most
profitable divisions should raider acquire one-third of target's shares); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 177 (Del. 1986)
(target corporation granted white knight option to purchase its health care divisions should raider acquire 20% of target's shares). The "Pac-Man" defense
describes a situation in which the target corporation takes over the raider to
avoid being taken over by the raider. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 625 (D. Md. 1982) (target commenced tender offer for
raider's shares in control battle waged in seven different courts). A "selftender" is a defensive mechanism whereby the target offers to buy its own shares

from shareholders of the corporation at a higher price than that offered by the
raider. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950 (Del.
1985) (target countered raider's tender offer of $54 per share with offer to
purchase its own shares for $72 per share). A "poison pill" is a stock, warrant or
right which a target issues to its shareholders which has little value until a tender
offer or large hostile stock acquisition occurs. Morrissey, supra note 2, at 136.
The cost of paying off these securities typically will be so high that the would-be
bidder would not be able to or would not want to acquire the target. Id.; see, e.g.,
Moran v. Household Int'l., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985) (target's defensive strategy involved issuance of rights which allowed target's shareholders
to acquire shares of raider at half price in event of successful takeover). "Leveraged buyout" describes the situation by which a target's directors tender debt
securities, with a face value higher than the market value of a target's shares, to
the target's shareholders in exchange for their shares. Lowenstein, Pruning
Deadwood in Hostile Takeover. A ProposalforLegislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 295
(1983). Directors often obtain capital needed for these transactions from investment groups. Management Buyouts: Are Public Shareholders Getting a FairDeal, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,436 (Oct. 6, 1983); see also Reiser, Corporate Takeovers: A
Glossary of Terms and Tactics, CASE & COMMENT, Nov-Dec. 1985, at 35.
4. This comment focuses on three decisions by the Delaware Supreme
Court: Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) (lock-up option); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985) (poison pill) and Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985) (discretionary self-tender); and one decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc.,
781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986) (lock-up option).
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higher price than that offered by the tender offeror. 5 This defensive maneuver prevents a takeover since the target purchases all or most of its
shares and, therefore, prevents the tender offeror from acquiring
enough shares to obtain control of the target. 6 A "poison pill" defense
identifies the scenario wherein the target's directors issue rights to their
shareholders which allow the shareholders to purchase shares of the
tender offeror at a reduced rate should the tender offeror succeed in a
takeover of the target corporation. 7 This technique discourages takeovers, as a tender offeror may not be willing to sell a large number of its
shares to the target's shareholders at a reduced rate.8 A "lock-up option" is a technique by which a target arranges to sell some of its attractive assets (the "crown jewels") to a third corporation if the tender
offeror acquires a certain percentage of the target's shares. 9 This mechanism discourages a tender offeror because the assets which the target
agrees to sell to the third corporation are usually the same assets which
the tender offeror wants to acquire.' 0
To aid in the understanding of the decisions which will be discussed, this comment will first discuss the reasons directors defend
against a corporate takeover" and trace the history of the business
judgment rule as a gauge for determining whether directors act appropriately when they use defensive mechanisms.' 2 This comment concludes with an analysis of the logic in four recent decisions and makes
suggestions as to the viable methods a corporation may use in defending
3
against a future takeover attempt.'
5. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 950 (Del.
1985) (target countered raider's tender offer of $54 per share with offer to
purchase its own shares at $72 per share).
6. See Note, supra note 3, at 301.

7. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1349 (Del. 1985)
(target issued rights to its shareholders which allowed them to acquire shares of
successful tender offeror at half price).
8. See, e.g., Wander & LeCoque, BoardroomJitters: Corporate Control Transactions and Today's BusinessJudgment Rule, 42 Bus. LAw. 29, 45 (1986) (most com-

mon type of poison pill is the shareholder rights plan or "flip-over" pill which
allows "stockholders to receive the right to buy shares in the corporation surviv!
ing a hostile merger at a substantially discounted price").
9. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
267 (2d Cir. 1986) (target arranged to sell two most profitable divisions to white
knight if tender offer succeeded).
10. See, e.g., id. at 279 (target optioned "crown jewels").
11. For a discussion of the reasons for defending against a takeover, see
infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
12. For a historical perspective of the interplay between the business judgment rule and the various defensive mechanisms, see infra notes 25-44 and accompanying text.
13. For an analysis of the four opinions, see infra notes 201-57 and accompanying text.
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REASONS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST A TAKEOVER

Empirical evidence indicates that there are many negative aspects to
a takeover and the resulting merger of two corporations. The value of
4
the acquiring corporation's stock frequently declines after a merger.'
In addition, a large number of employees of the acquired corporation
may be released because their jobs could be performed effectively by the
current employees of the acquiring corporation without additional
assistance. 15 Lastly, but most dramatically, the current takeovers may
have a severe effect on the national financial markets in the future if
corporate raiders and their targets are unable to pay the large debts
6
which they have incurred during a takeover struggle.'
In light of the disadvantages associated with takeovers and the resulting mergers, courts have found that the business judgment rule allows corporate directors to fend off unwelcome raiders under certain
14. See Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN.
EcON. 51, 81, table 9 (1983) (value of successful and unsuccessful bidder's stock
often decreased during 240 days after outcome of merger contest determined).
But see Jensen & Ruback, The Marketfor Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11
J. FIN. ECON. 5, 16-19 (1983) (although there are problems in accurate measurement, evidence indicates minimal increase in value of stock for both successful
and unsuccessful bidders); Kummer & Hoffmester, Valuation Consequences of Cash
Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN. 505 (1978) (takeovers lead to increase in wealth for both
bidding firm and target).
Although the results of studies evaluating the effect of a takeover of the
stock of the bidding corporation are not uniform, recent studies consistently
show that the value of a target's shares increases dramatically as a result of a
takeover bid. Asquith, supra, at 81 (indicating significant increase in price of
target's stock after date tender offer is announced); Jensen & Ruback, supra, at
10 (finding that price of target's stock in successful takeover increases approximately 29%); Kummer & Hoffmester, supra, at 505 (concluding that takeovers
increase wealth of target).
15. See Morrissey, supra note 2, at 113-14 (noting argument that hostile
tender offers must be restricted to protect workers and communities from severe
disruption). Chevron's acquisition of Gulf in 1984 is the largest corporate takeover to date. Bigger Yes, But Better?, TIME, Aug. 12, 1985, at 35. As a result of this

takeover, officials predict that 16,000 of the acquired company's 79,000 employees will be laid off. Id. Mergers have less dramatic, but still notable, effects on
the workplace. Id. New management or changes in responsibility may have negative effects on employee morale. Id.; see also Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624,
646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part) (noting that relocation of corporate
headquarters as a result of acquisition will inevitably have severe effect on locality from which headquarters was moved).
16. See Domenici, Fools and Their Takeover Bonds, Wall St.J., May 14, 1985, at

28, col. 4 (Chairman of Senate Budget Committee expressing concern that explosive increase in use of junk bonds could cripple financial markets if not repaid); Rohatyn,Junk Bonds and Other Securities Swill, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1985, at
30, col. 3 (observing that faith in financial markets could be shaken during recessionary period if corporations are not able to sell enough assets to make payments on debt from issuance of junk bonds); see also Morrissey, supra note 2, at
114 (discussing pros and cons of diverting funds from other sources to finance
tender offers).
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circumstances.1 7 Directors can reject a takeover bid on the grounds that
20
9
8
the price is inadequate, ' the offer is illegal, 1 the acquisition is illegal,
the target corporation desires to grow internally, 2 1 or the takeover will
have a negative impact on non-investment groups such as employees,
customers, creditors and the community. 2 2 A direct effect of the courts'
17. For a discussion of the reasons courts have given for allowing directors
to employ defensive tactics, see infra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (business judgment rule allows directors to reject tender offer based upon
investment banker's report that price was inadequate); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985) (directors have duty to defend
against takeover where securities offered in tender offer were "junk bonds"); see
also Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 102 (1979)
(citing cases which hold that directors can reject tender offer based on inadequate price).
19. See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318-23
(W.D. Mich. 1978) (concern about offer violating securities law is legitimate reason for target's directors to reject tender offer); Copperweld Corp. v. Imetal,
403 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (concern about tender offer violating antitrust
laws is legitimate reason for target's directors to reject offer); see also Lipton,
supra note 18, at 102 & n.5 (citing cases in which directors were able to reject
tender offer based on illegality of price).
20. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 404 F.2d 506
(3d Cir. 1969) (preliminary injunction granted where merger created probability
of antitrust violations), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); Berman v. Gerber
Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1326 & n.3 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (directors did
not breach fiduciary duty by opposing tender offer which they believed to present antitrust problems); Gulf& Western Indus. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 356
F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.) (raider prevented from proceeding with tender offer
where target alleged potential violations of antitrust laws), aff'd, 476 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1973); see also Lipton, supra note 18, at 102 & n.6 (noting cases in which
directors rejected tender offer because acquisition would be illegal).
21. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.)
(directors do not breach fiduciary duty by rejecting merger advances because of
desire to grow internally), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Herald Co. v. Weawell, 472 F.2d 1081, 1092 (10th Cir. 1972)
(recognizing that directors of corporation engaged in publication of large metropolitan newspaper have duty to employees and public, as well as to shareholders and, thus, may reject takeover if any of these constituencies are jeopardized
by takeover); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del.
1985) (directors can consider effect of takeover on constituencies other than
shareholders, such as creditors, customers, employees and general public, in determining whether to accept tender offer). But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986) (board may consider interests of constituencies other than stockholders "provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders"). Several commentators agree with
the progressive viewpoint of these courts; namely, that the directors of a corporation can consider interests other than those of the shareholders in deciding
whether to accept or reject a takeover. See, e.g., Block & Miller, The Responsibilities
and Obligations of CorporateDirectors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44, 68-70

(1983) (suggesting that confluence of business judgment rule protections and
recognition of expanded constituencies has greatly increased power of directors); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 882, 902 (1978) (suggesting that non-investor interests such as preservation of locally-controlled businesses may be legitimate considerations in deci-
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recognition that there are appropriate reasons for rejecting a tender offer is the development of innovative defensive techniques by directors
who have legimate reasons for fighting a tender offer. 23 The discretionary self-tender, the poison pill and the lock-up option are the newest
24
developments in the expansion of defensive techniques.
III.

BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

In the wake of increased takeover activity, the business judgment
rule provides a standard by which a court can evaluate the actions of the
target's directors in defending against a hostile takeover. 25 Stated gension to resist takeover attempt). Commentators have also suggested other
reasons for implementing defensive mechanisms. One commentator has suggested that defensive mechanisms may be used to stall a tender offer. Steinbrink, supra, at 896-98. This use is advantageous because the investing public is
given time to assess the worth of the target corporation and determine whether
they want to submit a higher bid for the target's stock than that offered by the
raider. Id. at 896.
Another commentator examined the histories of 36 companies that were
targets of unwanted tender offers between 1973 and 1979, and found that, in
1979, the shares of more than half of these targets were either selling at a price
higher than the rejected offer price, or had subsequently been acquired by a
third party at a price higher than that offered by the raider. Lipton, supra note
18, at 106-07. The same author cited a study by Goldman Sachs & Co. which
demonstrated that in 95% of the cases in which a corporation had been acquired
by a third party after successfully defeating an unwelcome tender offer, the
shareholders realized a higher price than that offered in the original tender offer. Id. at 108. The author also noted that in rejecting a tender offer, it may be
important for a corporation to assure employees, suppliers, customers and the
communities in which it operates of its intent to remain independent and continue its current policies. Id. at 110 (discussing negative reaction by authors and
editors to struggle for control between two publishers).
Commentators who support the right of directors to resist a takeover attempt usually suggest that takeovers may have serious, negative, social and economic impacts. For example, one author has suggested that restricting the
ability of directors to defend against takeovers wouldjeopardize the economy by
hampering long-term planning. Lipton, supra note 18, at 105. Another has referred to the unquantifiable impact on a small community that results from a
change in ownership or control of a company that is the dominant employer in
the community. Steinbrink, supra, at 902; see also Bigger Yes, But Better?, supra note
15, at 35 (noting that approximately 16,000 of 79,000 employees of target in
recent takeover are expected to lose their jobs).
23. Brennan, New Cases on the BusinessJudgment Rule. Defending Defensive Tactics Becomes More Difficult, 14 SEC. REG. LJ. 245 (1986).
24. For a discussion of these latest innovative attempts to ward off takeover
attempts, see infra notes 55-200 and accompanying text.
25. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
272-83 (2d Cir. 1986) (evaluating lock-up option under business judgment rule);
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295-97 (7th Cir.) (directors' policy
of resisting takeovers protected by business judgment rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1092 (1981); Asarco Inc. v. A. Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 480 (D.N.J. 1985) (business judgment rule allows directors to employ defensive tactics if they articulate
reasons why defensive tactic is in best interest of shareholders); Horwitz v.
Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev. 1985) (business
judgment rule used to evaluate whether directors breached fiduciary duty by
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erally, the business judgment rule immunizes a director from liability if
he has acted conscientiously in performing his corporate duties, but the
corporation or its shareholders, nevertheless, have suffered harm because of his actions. 2 6 In legal terms, a director is protected if he does
implementing poison pill); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 179-84 (Del. 1986) (business judgment rule used to evaluate
poison pill and lock-up option); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1355-57 (Del. 1985) (directors' action in adopting poison pill evaluated under
business judgment rule); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
954-55 (Del. 1985) (discretionary self-tender analyzed under business judgment
rule).
The underpinnings for the business judgment rule began during the industrial revolution when courts sought to protect individuals against liability for
ordinary negligence and honest mistakes in judgment made while managing corporate affairs. See, e.g., Ellerman v. Chicago Junction Rys. & Union Stock-Yards
Co., 49 N.J. Eq. 217, 232, 23 A. 287, 292 (N.J. Ch. 1891) (shareholders "cannot
question in judicial proceedings the corporate acts of directors, if the same are
within powers of the corporation and in furtherance of its purposes, are not
unlawful or against good morals, and are done in good faith and in the exercise
of an honest judgment"); Hodges v. New England Screw Co., 1 R.I. 312 (1850)
(directors are not liable for financial losses to corporation when they exercised
good faith and acted in corporation's best interest). For a discussion of the historical development of the business judgment rule and its application to takeovers, see Morrissey, supra note 2, at 120-36 (concluding that courts should not
uncritically accept the business judgment of target company's board); Wander &
Le Cogal, Boardroom Letters: CorporateControl Transactionsand Today's BusinessJudg-

ment Rule, 42 Bus. LAW. 29, 29-30 (1986) (noting that courts have begun to assume the role of protector of the shareholder by undertaking a more active role
in reviewing anti-takeover board decisions); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics
and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 657 (1983) (stating that
likelihood of director self-interest should be considered but does not require
abolition of the business judgment rule); Note, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.:
The Good Faith Standardfor Corporate Directors, 15 U.

RICH.

L.

REV.

405, 426-27

(1982) (observing that courts scrutinize director decisions more carefully when
large amounts of shares are bought or issued in defensive maneuvers to avoid
takeover); Note, Tender Offer Decisions: Effect of the BusinessJudgment Rule, 45

ALB.

L. REV. 1122, 1128 (1981) (noting that director conflict of interest is basis for
rejection of business judgment rule application to tender offer decisions).
26. See, e.g., Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir.
1980) (business judgment rule protects directors who act lawfully and in good
faith with purpose of protecting corporation); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454
F. Supp. 1310, 1319 (W.D. Mich. 1978) ("There can be no doubt that corporate
officers and directors have a high fiduciary duty of honesty and fair dealing with
shareholders ....

Nevertheless, it is also well established that corporate man-

agement may not be held liable for good faith errors in judgment."). See also
Johnson, Anti- Takeover Actions and Defenses: BusinessJudgment or Breach of Duty?, 28
VILL. L. REV. 51, 52/n.6 (1983) (since shareholders chose directors, they cannot

hold directors liable for decisions made in good faith); Note, Tender Offer Decisions: Effect of the BusinessJudgment Rule, 45 ALB. L.

REV.

1122, 1122 (1981) (busi-

ness judgment rule protects directors from liability for losses when they
exercised sound business judgment).
Three purported justifications for the business judgment rule are usually
offered. First, the rule provides directors with the flexibility necessary to formulate corporate policy. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (rule
allows directors to make corporate decisions without fear of judicial secondguessing), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983); see also Block & Prussia, The Business
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not act in bad faith, 2 7 in a fraudulent manner 28 or in his own self29
interest.
Courts generally recognize two components to the business judgment rule-a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. 30 In the context of a
tender offer, a target's director satisfies his duty of care by making an
informed decision about whether the tender offer is in the best interest
of the target. 3 ' Thus, a director must use reasonable diligence to acJudgment Rule and ShareholderDerivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAw. 27, 32

(1981) (business judgment rule allows directors to make risky but prudent business decisions). Second, the rule allows competent individuals to become members of a corporate board without the fear of personal liability for reasonable
decisions made by the board. Id. at 32-33. Courts expressed a concern for obtaining quality directors as early as 1847. Godbold v. Branch Bank, 11 Ala. 191,
199 (1847) (to require such perfect knowledge that directors cannot err without
liability would mean that "no man of ordinary prudence would accept a trust
surrounded by such peril"). Third, but perhaps most important, the rule frees
the courts from determining the legitimacy of complex corporate decisions.
Block & Prussia, supra, at 32-33 (most important rationale for business judgment
rule is to avoid over-burdening courts). Courts do not have the time or facilities
to engage in such evaluation. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979) ("courts are ill-equipped and
infrequently called on to evaluate what are and must be essential business judgments"); see also Gilson, supra note 2, at 822 (rule "functions less as a standard of
management conduct as a statement of judicial restraint").
27. See Treadways Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-83 (2d Cir. 1980)
(plaintiff has initial burden of showing that directors had interest in transaction
or acted in bad faith or for improper motive); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980) (business judgement rule puts burden on plaintiff to
show bad faith), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
28. See Panter v. Marshal Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 296 (7th Cir.) (business
judgment rule presumes that directors acted in best interest of corporation unless plaintiffs prove fraud, bad faith or self-dealing), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979) (plaintiff must prove fraud or bad faith on part of
directors); Kalmanash v. Smith, 291 N.Y. 142, 155, 51 N.E.2d 681, 687, 45
N.Y.S.2d 142, 155 (1943) ("Nor may judicial process be invoked to challenge
the judgment of directors except when fraud is alleged, or conduct is so oppressive as to be its equivalent .... ").
29. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (business
judgment rule protects director whose motive for defending against takeover is
not solely to retain control), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Cheffv. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964) (use of corporate funds to defend
against takeover is appropriate if directors' sole or primary motive is not to retain control).
30. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.
1984) ("board member's obligation to a corporation and its shareholders has
two prongs, generally characterized as the duty of care and duty of loyalty").
For a discussion of the directors' duty of care, see infra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the directors' duty of loyalty, see infra notes
35-41 and accompanying text.
31. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (duty of care
requires directors to exercise informed business judgment); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (directors must take action only after they analyze
all material information reasonably available to them); see also Gearhart Indus. v.
Smith Int'l, 592 F. Supp. 203, 225 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (duty of care requires direc-
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quire and to evaluate information about the tender offer. 32 A director
who fails to consider alternatives to defending against a takeover,3 3 or
who does not obtain the advice of outside counsel, attorneys or investment analysts, for example, as to the merits of the tender offer, breaches
34
the duty of care.
A director's duty of loyalty evolved from the idea that a director is a
fiduciary and, therefore, has a duty to act in the best interests of the
tors to act as reasonably prudent persons in similar situations); Wander &
LeCoque, supra note 8, at 38 (recent demand by courts that directors make in-

formed decisions reflects increased emphasis on duty of care).
32. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
(duty of care places responsibility on directors to act as reasonably prudent person acting as fiduciary); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130,
1134 (D. Nev. 1985) (same); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985) (directors have duty to take steps to inform themselves of all material
information reasonably available to them).
33. See MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d
1239, 1249-50 (Del. Ch. 1985) (directors breached fiduciary duty by granting
lock-up option to one of two suitors and refusing to entertain bids from other
suitor), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Thomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320,
323-24 (Del. Ch. 1979) (directors breached duty of care by ignoring bid for assets of target which was significantly higher than selling price).
34. Directors must make intelligent, advised, judgments. Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). Directors are able to rely reasonably,
and in good faith, on experts chosen with due care. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.) (directors entitled to rely on experts
from outside of corporation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Cheff v. Mathes,
41 Del. Ch. 494, 507, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (1964) (directors properly relied on
reports of investment bankers in fending off raider who had "bad reputation" in
business community and may have attempted to liquidate target to obtain quick
profit); Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (board entitled
to rely on reports of investment bankers in setting price for stock repurchase).
Some state corporate laws allow directors to rely on expert opinions. See,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (1983) (directors fully protected if they rely
on opinion of expert chosen with reasonable care); N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 712(2)
(Consol. 1963 & Supp. 1986) (directors in performing duty, may rely upon opinions of experts regarding matters in their field of expertise). However, the Second Circuit, interpreting New York law, recently limited the ability of directors
to rely on the reports of outside counsel. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 275 (2d Cir. 1986). The Hanson court found that directors must become reasonably familiar with reports before they are allowed to
rely on the conclusions of the reports. Id. (citing, inter alia, A.L.I., Principles of
Corporate Governance.- Analysis and Recommendations § 4.02 at 76-79 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, April 12, 1985)). Commentators have agreed that directors should use
reasonable diligence in reviewing the opinions and reports of outside counsel.
Hawes & Sherrard, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense in Corporateand Securities Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 1, 48-49 (1976) (management may raise reliance defense
when they reasonably relied on advice of counsel relating to questions of law);
Longstreth, Reliance on Advice of Counsel as a Defense to Security Law Violations, 37
Bus. LAw. 1185, 1190-93 (1982) (defense of reliance rests on good faith and due
care in selection of counsel, disclosure of facts to counsel, receipt of advice from
counsel and action in accordance with that advice); Small, The Evolving Rule of the
Director in CorporateGovernance, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 1353, 1359-62, 1382-83 (1979)
(standard of good faith and due care requires selection of competent counsel,
full disclosure, reasonable reliance and action in accordance with advice).
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shareholders of the corporation.3 5 At one time this principle was so
strictly enforced that any contract made between a director and the corporation was voidable by the corporation, regardless of the fairness of
its terms. 3 6 This standard has been modified by a presumption within
the business judgment rule that all actions taken by corporate directors
are motivated by sound business judgment rather than personal interest.3 7 This modification is important in the takeover context, as successful resistance to a tender offer by the target's directors has the collateral
effect of perpetuating the directors' self-interest in maintaining control
of the target. 3 8 Consequently, courts uniformly revised the standard for
determining whether the directors have breached their duty of loyalty so
35. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.
1984) ("duty of loyalty derives from the prohibition against self-dealing that inheres in the fiduciary relationship"); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292
(3d Cir. 1980) (director is fiduciary but is not held to same standard as ordinary
fiduciary because by nature of corporate life, director has certain amount of selfinterest in everything he does), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
Corporate directors owe an allegiance to the corporation and all actions
taken by directors should be motivated by a consideration for the welfare of the
corporation. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 897 (Del. 1985). Typical
violations of the duty of loyalty arise when directors compete with the corporation or when directors take advantage of an opportunity which would have been

attractive to the corporation. H.

HENN

&J. ALEXANDER,

LAW OF CORPORATIONS

625-44 (3d ed. 1983). A potential violation of the duty of loyalty arises when
directors participate in financial dealings with the corporation. Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (directors must show "intrinsic
fairness of arrangement"). In cases alleging a violation of the duty of loyalty,
courts will carefully review the directors' actions and the financial arrangements
to determine whether the corporation and its shareholders were treated equitably. Morrissey, supra note 2, at 123.
36. See, e.g., Wardell v. Union Pacific R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1880) (director cannot obtain valuable contracts from corporation for whom he is director);
see also Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36 (1966) (noting that any
contract between a corporation and a director was, at one time, voidable). The
courts relaxed this inflexible principle over the years, and by 1910, the prevailing rule was that a contract between a director and his corporation which was
approved by a majority of disinterested directors would be upheld unless found
to be unfair or fraudulent. Id. at 39-40.
37. SeeJohnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981). The Johnson court explained that although directors are
said to be fiduciaries, they cannot be held to the same standards as a fiduciary of
a trust, who may not have the slightest interest in any transaction made on behalf of the trust. Id. The court reasoned that a corporate director has a certain
amount of self-interest in every corporate action-preservation of his job. Id.
According to the court, the business judgment rule alleviates this problem by
presuming that all actions taken by the directors are for the benefit of the corporation, regardless of whether they have a positive effect on the directors themselves. Id. The plaintiff then has the burden of presenting evidence that the
directors were, in fact, primarily motivated by their own self-interest and not the
interests of the corporation. Id.; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812
(Del. 1984) (presumption under business judgment rule that directors "acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in honest belief that action taken was in the
best interest of the company.").
38. See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. and Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 378-79
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that plaintiffs were required to prove that the directors' "sole or primary" reason for defending against the takeover was self-perpetua40
tion. 3 9 Such a standard places a very heavy burden upon the plaintiffs,
(7th Cir. 1984). The Treco court described the dilemma of directors confronted
with a takeover threat:
If they determine in good faith that the threatened action is adverse to
the corporation's interest, they have a duty to resist the action forcefully (citations omitted). But successful resistance will likely have the
collateral effect of perpetuating the incumbent directors' control, so
that a director's self-interest in maintaining control may appear to be
one of the purposes of resistance.
Id. at 378.
Manuel F. Cohen, a former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission stated that "[i]t would be naive to assume that tender offers are not, at
times, opposed by managements motivated by their own interests in staving off a
change of control." Full Disclosureof CorporateEquity Ownership in Corporate Takeover
Bids: Hearings on S.510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967); accord, Johnson, supra note 26,
at 54 & n.14 (takeover defenses tend to preserve management's position and
economic advantages); Steinbrink, supra note 22, at 902 (observing that management's desire to implement plans and achieve goals which it set for the corporation is a form of self-interest in perpetuating control). Consequently, whenever
a target's directors choose to resist a takeover, they may be accused of trying to
preserve their jobs at the expense of the company and its shareholders. See
Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il.1969).
Two commentators have taken the position that because of the unavoidable
conflicts of interest inherent in the decisions by incumbent management to resist
a takeover attempt, courts should not apply the business judgment rule to shield
their decisions from judicial review. Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholder's Welfare, 36 Bus. Law. 1733, 1745-46 (1981).
39. See, e.g., Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. and Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Illinois law); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690,
701-03 (2d Cir. 1980) (New York law); Schilling v. Belcher, 582 F.2d 995, 1004
(5th Cir. 1978) (Florida law); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir. 1977)
(Massachusetts law); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130,
1135 (D. Nev. 1985) (Nevada law); Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit,
237 Md. 1, 21-22, 204 A.2d 795, 805-06 (1964) (Maryland law). The primary
source of the "sole or primary purpose" test is Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494,
504-05, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964). The Delaware Supreme Court, in Cheff, derived this test from earlier decisions. Id. (citing Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch.
14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962)) (directors may only take actions which are primarily in
the interest of corporation); Yasik v. Wachtel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 256, 17 A.2d 309,
313 (1941) (directors may not use issuance of shares to accomplish improper
purpose, such as maintaining control of corporation)). The Cheffcourt changed
the test slightly from that in Bennett, which required directors to show that the
action taken was "one primarily in the corporate interest." Bennett, 41 Del. Ch.
at 14, 22, 187 A.2d at 405, 409 (1962). In Cheff, the court required the directors
to prove the inverse, namely, that the action taken was not taken solely or primarily to benefit the directors. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 504, 199 A.2d at 554.
If a plaintiff proves that the "sole or primary" reason for a director employing a defensive mechanism was to secure his employment, then the burden shifts
to the director to prove that his actions were in the best interest of the corporation. See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Sav. and Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 379 n.8
(7th Cir. 1984); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir.
1984).
The Delaware courts are unique in that they put the initial burden of proof
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which has caused some courts to decline to use this standard. 4 1
If a plaintiff is able to prove that a director breached his duty of care
or duty of loyalty, then the burden of proof shifts to the director to
prove that the transaction was fair and served the best interests of the
on the defendant directors who use defensive tactics to avoid a takeover which
would threaten corporate policy. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F.
Supp. 294, 305 (D. Del. 1981); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504-05, 199
A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964). In Chef, for example, Marymont Automotive Products sought to take over Holland Furniture Co. by purchasing a controlling
block of Holland stock. Cheff, 41 Del. Ch. at 499-500, 199 A.2d at 551-52. The
directors of Holland arranged to purchase the shares, which Marymont had obtained, at an amount in excess of the market value of the shares. Id. The court
found that the directors had satisfied their initial burden by proving that the
shares were purchased in order to continue proper business purposes and not
"solely or primarily" to preserve the directors' positions. Id. at 508, 199 A.2d at
556.
In its most recent pronouncements, the Delaware Supreme Court has stated
that the defendant directors have the initial burden of proof whenever the legitimacy of a defensive mechanism is called into question. Moran v. Household
Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). However, the burden which directors must meet
has changed. Now, the directors satisfy their burden by showing that they acted
in good faith and after reasonable investigation and that the defensive mechanism employed was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Moran, 500 A.2d
at 1356.
Other jurisdictions, however, have not shifted the initial burden to the defendant directors. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781
F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that initial burden of proof is on plaintiff
under New York law in takeover context, but initial burden is on defendant
under Delaware law). For a further discussion of the implications of Delaware's
distribution of the burden of proof in the takeover context, see infra notes 20125 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Note, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.: Unbridled Discretion of
Management to Resist Hostile Tender Offer, 33 MERCER L. REV. 647, 650 (1982) (examination of defensive tactics under business judgment rule is almost non-existent); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the BusinessJudgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 621, 655 (1983) (business judgment rule is "impenetrable shield" for
defensive tactics of target's management).
Courts have emphasized that plaintiffs do not meet their burden simply by
showing that "one" of the directors' motives was to provide for continued job
security. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981). Plaintiffs must prove that personal motivations of the directors dominated their actions. Id.; Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 294 (7th Cir.) ("a" motive to control is insufficient to rebut presumption
under business judgment rule), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Cummings v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, 237 Md. 1, 21-22, 204 A.2d 795, 805-06 (1964)
(directors liable only if manipulation for control of corporation is principle motivation for action by board).
41. The Delaware Supreme Court, for instance, has declined to use the sole
or primary purpose test in its recent opinions and, instead, has chosen simply to
apply a new test. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A,2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). For
an extensive discussion of the new test applied by the Delaware Supreme Court,
see infra notes 201-25 and accompanying text.
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corporation and the shareholders. 4 2 Even though a director may be accused of breaching his duty of care or loyalty by opposing a tender offer, 43 courts have found that a director has a responsibility to oppose
those offers which he fairly believes will be detrimental to the
44
corporation.
IV.

RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE TO

DEFENSIVE TACTICS

Recently, the Delaware Supreme Court and the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit have decided four cases involving the
business judgment rule which provide significant guidance for target directors who are deciding which defensive mechanisms they may lawfully
employ to defend against a present or potential hostile takeover. 4 5 In
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,46 the Delaware Supreme Court held
that a target corporation's self-tender for its own shares at a price higher
than the raider's tender offer was legal even though the target did not
extend this offer to the raider, which owned a substantial number of the
target's shares. 4 7 Three months later, in Moran v. Household International,
Inc.,48 the Delaware Supreme Court approved the establishment of a
rights plan by a target's directors which allowed the target's shareholders to purchase the raider's shares at a reduced price should the raider
successfully take over the target. 49 Subsequently, the Second Circuit invalidated a lock-up option in Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition
Inc.50 when it found that the target's directors breached their duty of
care under the business judgment rule since there was no evidence that

42. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.
1984); Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (D. Nev.
1985).
43. See, e.g., Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712
(N.D. Ill. 1969) (directors may always be accused of attempting to preserve control when they oppose a tender offer); see also Lipton, supra note 18, at 101 (almost every successful takeover defense results in shareholder derivative action).
44. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del.
1985) (board has fundamental duty to protect corporate enterprise from harm
reasonably perceived); Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706,
712 (N.D. Ill. 1969) (directors obligated to oppose tender offers which are not in
best interest of corporation or its shareholders). For a discussion of the dilemma of directors when confronted with a takeover attempt, see supra note 38.
45. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d
Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173

(Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp.

v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).

46. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
47. Id. at 957. For a further discussion of Unocal, see infra notes 55-89 and
accompanying text.

48. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
49. Id. at 1357. For a further discussion of Moran, see infra notes 90-120
and accompanying text.
50. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
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the lock-up option would promote bidding between competing tender
offerors and, thus, assure that the target's shareholders received the
maximum value for their shares. 5 1 Finally, the Delaware Supreme
Court, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. ,52 held that the
target's directors violated their fiduciary duty both by entering into a

lock-up option, which required the target to sell two of its key divisions
to one of two competing tender offerors, and by entering into a "no
shop" provision, which prevented the target from seeking a higher bid
than that of the tender offeror who was to purchase the divisions. 53 In
each of these cases, the business judgment rule was the benchmark for
gauging the validity of the defensive mechanisms employed by the
54
targets' directors.
A.

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.

Mesa Petroleum ("Mesa") commenced a two-tier "front-loaded"
tender offer 55 for sixty-four million shares of Unocal stock. 5 6 If success51. Id. at 283. For a further discussion of Hanson Trust, see infra notes 12157 and accompanying text.
52. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
53. Id. at 184-85. For a further discussion of Revlon, see infra notes 157-200
and accompanying text.
54. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264,
272-83 (2d Cir. 1986) (evaluated lock-up option under business judgment rule);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179-84 (Del.
1986) (business judgment rule used to evaluate poison pill and lock-up option);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1355-57 (Del. 1985) (directors'
action in adopting poison pill evaluated under business judgment rule); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (discretionary
self-tender analyzed under business judgment rule).
55. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-50. A two-tier tender offer is a means for a
raider to acquire one hundred percent of the shares of a target. Note, Protecting
Shareholders Against Partialand Two- Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97
HARV. L. REV. 1964, 1966 (1984). The raider initiates this type of tender offer
by offering to purchase enough of the target's shares to obtain a controlling
interest in the target at a price which exceeds the current value of the shares. Id.
The raider then offers to purchase the remaining shares at a lower price. Id.
Since the price which the tender offeror is willing to pay in the first tier exceeds
that which the tender offeror is willing to pay in the second tier, the tender offer
is considered "front-loaded." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. A front-loaded tender
offer gives the target's shareholders an incentive to tender their shares in the
first tier, so that they can receive a premium for their shares. See Note, supra, at
1966. For instance, in Unocal, Mesa offered to pay 54 dollars in cash for every
share tendered in the first tier. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. In the second tier,
however, Mesa offered only high risk debt securities with a face value of 54 dollars. Id. at 949-50. These securities, labeled "junk bonds" by the Delaware
Supreme Court, were actually worth far less than 54 dollars. Id.
Two-tier tender offers are considered coercive because they tend to coerce
shareholders to tender their shares in the first of the two tiers so that they do not
receive the lower value in the second tier. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Economics of Partialand Two-Tier Tender Offers,
49 Fed. Reg. 26755, 26756-57 (June 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Chief Economist]. In addition, more shareholders are generally willing to tender their
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ful, Mesa would have obtained a controlling interest (fifty-one percent)
in Unocal. 5 7 The Unocal board of directors, 5 8 believing that the Mesa
tender offer was inadequate, decided to employ a discretionary selftender to ward off the tender offeror. 59 Under this defensive measure, if
Mesa obtained a controlling interest in Unocal, then Unocal would offer
to purchase the remaining forty-nine percent of its own shares at a price
shares in the first tier than the tender offeror is willing to acquire in the first tier.
Id. at 26757-58. Under the prorationing rules of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, the tender offeror must acquire that percentage of stock which it offered
to acquire in the first tier on a pro rata basis. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982) (requires tender offeror to take up pro rata share of stock tendered by each security
holder if tender offer oversubscribed 10 days after it is made). The shareholders
will be forced to accept the value offered in the second tier for the remaining
shares which the tender offeror does not acquire in the first tier. Chief Economist, supra, at 26757-58. Arguably, a two-tier tender offer is coercive because
shareholders have no way to reject an offer if they believe that the combined
value they will receive from tendering their shares in the first and second tier is
too low because, if the shareholders refuse to tender their shares in the first tier,
they would have to tender all of their shares in the second tier for the lower
price. Id. See generally Finkelstein, Antitakeover ProtectionAgainst Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions
Under Delaware Law, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 293 (1984) (noting that two-step
transactions are coercive because they put pressure on shareholders to tender in
first step to avoid freeze-out for less consideration in second step); Lipton, supra
note 18, at 113-14 (concluding that it is almost impossible for wise investor not
to tender shares in first tier of two-tier tender offer). But see Chief Economist,
supra, at 26757 (study questions coerciveness of two-tier tender offers because
difference between premium in first and second tier often is not significant).
Courts have also recognized the coerciveness of two-tier tender offers. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 (noting that two-tier tender offers are well recognized as
classic coercive measures); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp.
623, 630 (D. Md. 1982) (concluding that two-step offers are coercive).
56. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. 64 million shares represented approximately
37% of Unocal's outstanding shares. Id.
57. Id. Before the tender offer, Mesa owned just over 13% of the shares of
Unocal. Id. Coupled with the 37% of Unocal's shares which Mesa wishes to
acquire through the tender offer, Mesa would have obtained a controlling interest in Unocal. Id.
58. Id. at 950. Eight independent outside directors and six insiders sat on
the Unocal board. Id. Throughout the Unocal opinion, the court emphasized the
importance of the fact that a majority of the Unocal board of directors were
independent and that they performed their fiduciary duties. Id. at 955. For a
further discussion of the importance of the presence of independant directors
on the board of a corporation confronted with a takeover, see infra notes 226-40
and accompanying text.
59. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950. The Unocal board met with its legal and financial consultants, including representatives from investment bankers Goldman
Sachs & Co. and Dillon, Read & Co., regarding the Mesa tender offer. Id. Using
valuation techniques employed in the oil and gas industry, the financial consultants opined that the minimum cash value that could be expected from a sale or
liquidation of 100% of Unocal's stock was in excess of $60 per share. Id. Consequently, these consultants concluded that Mesa's $54, two-tier, tender offer
was inadequate. Id. Based upon this advice and their own deliberations, the
Unocal board decided to reject Mesa's tender offer. Id. at 951.
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higher than that offered by Mesa. 60 Unocal, however, prohibited Mesa
from participating in the self-tender 6 ' and, as a result, Mesa filed suit
62
seeking to enjoin the self-tender.
In considering Mesa's claim, the Delaware Supreme Court began by
evaluating whether directors have the authority to defend against takeovers. 63 The court concluded that directors have such authority for two
reasons. First, Delaware corporate law allows directors to manage the
corporation's "business and affairs" 6 4 and allows directors to control
60. Id. at 951. A representative from Goldman Sachs & Co. advised the
Unocal board that a self-tender would cause Unocal to incur debt in excess of $6
million, a sum which would necessitate the reduction of Unocal's exploratory
drilling but would, nonetheless, enable it to remain a viable entity. Id. at 950.
Under the self-tender, Unocal offered senior debt securities with a par value
of $72 for its shares. Id. at 951. Debt securities are certificates which identify
that the corporation is indebted to the holder of the certificate for the face value
of the certificate. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1108-10 (5th ed. 1979). Debt securities are different from shares of stock
in that shares represent a shareholder's ownership or equity interest in the corporation. Id. at 1111-12.
Unocal later waived the condition that Mesa first obtain a controlling interest in Unocal for the purchase of 50 million shares or approximately 30% of the
shares before Unocal would make its own exchange offer. Unocal, 493 A.2d at
951. This was done in reaction to a perceived concern of the shareholders that if

their shares were tendered to Unocal no shares would be purchased by either
offeror. Id.
61. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 951. Unocal would not allow Mesa to participate

because the purpose of the self-tender was to assure that the 49% of the Unocal
shareholders who did not exchange their shares in the first tier of the Mesa offer

would not be forced to exchange their shares for Mesa's junk bonds in the second tier of the Mesa offer. Id. at 951. Every share that Mesa was allowed to
exchange in the Unocal self-tender would prevent other Unocal shareholders
from exchanging their shares for the $72 debt securities which Unocal offered to
protect them. Id.
62. Id. The Delaware Chancery Court issued an order temporarily restraining Unocal from proceeding with the exchange offer unless the offer was
extended to include Mesa. Id. at 952. Unocal immediately sought an interlocutory appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. Id. The Chancery Court declined
to certify the appeal, ruling that the granting of a temporary restraining order
did not decide a legal issue of first impression and that there existed no conflict
with prior decisions of the Chancery Court. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court,
however, ruled that the decision to grant a temporary restraining order was

clearly determinative of substantive rights of the parties and presented an issue
of first impression in Delaware. Id. The Supreme Court thus concluded that the
temporary restraining order was an unappealable decision. Id. The Chancery
Court thereafter certified Unocal's interlocutory appeal as a question of first im-

pression. Id. at 953. Because of the need for a timely resolution of the case, the
entire matter was scheduled on an expedited basis. Id. & n.5.
63. Id. at 953-56. The court stated the basic issue which it sought to resolve
as follows: "Did the Unocal board have the power and duty to oppose a takeover threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to the corporate enterprise,
and if so, is its action here entitled to the protection of the business judgment
rule?" Id. at 953.
64. Id. The court noted that one source of a director's power to defend
against takeovers is implicit within § 141(a) of the Delaware Corporate Code
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the use of the corporation's stock. 65 Second, common law principles
require directors to protect the corporate enterprise from harm which
66
they reasonably perceive.
After determining that directors have the authority to defend
against takeovers, the court evaluated the directors' conduct under the
business judgment rule. 67 The court, however, altered the traditional
burden of proof under the business judgment rule by determining that
which allows directors to manage the "business and affairs" of the corporation.
Id. Section 141(a) provides in pertinent part:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this
chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of
incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the
board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to
such extent and by such person or persons as shall be provided in the
certificate of incorporation.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
65. 493 A.2d at 953. The court also found that § 160(a) of the Delaware
Corporate Code, which allows directors to deal with the stock of its corporations, permits directors to use the stock as a deterrent to a takeover attempt. Id.
(citing 8 Del. Laws 160(a) (1983)). Section 160(a) provides in pertinent part:
"Every corporation may purchase, redeem, receive, take or otherwise acquire,

own and hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, pledge, use
and otherwise deal in and with its own share." 8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a)
(1983). The court noted that, under this provision, a Delaware corporation may
deal selectively with its stockholders in the acquisition of its own shares, provided the directors do not act with a sole or primary purpose of entrenching
themselves. 493 A.2d at 954 (citing Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568-69
(Del. Ch. 1977); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554
(1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (1962); Kors v.
Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 54, 158 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Del. Ch. 1960); Martin v.
American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 240, 92 A.2d 295, 302
(1952)).
66. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The court found that a wide body of case law

supports the idea that directors must act against potential harm to a corporation.
Id. (citing, inter alia, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir.)
(lawful action taken to protect corporation valid under business judgment rule),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st Cir.
1977) (management has right and duty to resist takeover which would harm corporation by all lawful means)). The court continued by finding that defending
against a takeover attempt is one way for a director to fulfill this duty. Id. at 957.
The court further noted that it disagreed with commentators who suggest that
the decision to resist a tender offer is entitled to less deference than are other
corporate decisions under the business judgment rule. Id. at 954 & n.9 (citing,
inter alia, Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981)).
67. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. The court cited a recent decision by the Delaware Superior Court for the proposition that the business judgment rule is the
proper yardstick to use in measuring the appropriateness of a defensive measure. Id. (citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (standards
under business judgment rule should be used to evaluate directors conduct in
takeover context)). The court also noted the effect of applying the business
judgment rule, observing that the rule protects directors from any personal liability so long as the directors' decisions can be "attributed to any rational busi-
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directors are not automatically afforded the protection of the business
judgment rule when they employ defensive tactics. 68 Since the directors
necessarily are protecting their own employment by defending against a
takeover, 69 the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that the directors can
receive the protections of the business judgment rule only if they first
prove that 1) the defensive measure is in the best interest of the corporation 70 and 2) the defensive measure is reasonable in relation to the
7
threat posed. '
The court found that the Unocal discretionary self-tender was in the
best interest of the corporation and that the primary purpose for the
offer was not the entrenchment of the directors in their offices. 7 2 The
court agreed with the Unocal directors that the Mesa tender offer was
inadequate and that the directors should fight the tender offer. 73 The
ness purpose." Id. (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. Super. Ct. 1971)).
68. Id. Traditionally, under the business judgment rule, the party challenging the board's decision had the initial burden of proving that the board
breached their duty of loyalty or duty of care. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney,
Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1984). For a discussion of the reallocation of the burden of proof by the Delaware courts in breach of fiduciary duty
cases, see supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
69. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55. The court found that, because of the potential that directors will act in their own best interest when they employ defensive tactics, the judiciary must carefully examine the directors' actions before
affording the directors the protection of the business judgment rule. Id. For a
discussion of the directors' potential conflict of interest in the context of defending against takeovers, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
70. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The directors must prove that it was reasonable for them to believe that a takeover would impede corporate policy and the
ability of the corporation to operate. Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 504-05, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (1964)). The directors satisfy this burden by
showing that they made a good faith investigation of the advantages and disadvantages of the takeover before deciding to defend against the takeover. Id. (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964)). The court
noted that proof of a good faith investigation is materially enhanced if a majority
of the board is composed of independent directors who make a good faith investigation. Id. (citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971)).
For a discussion of the importance of independent directors to courts evaluating a defensive tactic, see infra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
71. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The court cited no prior decisions to support
this new element of balance. Id. Instead, the court cited only a recent commentator. Id. (citing Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Responsibilities and Director's Re-

sponsibilities: An Update, ABA National Institute on the Dynamics of Corporate
Control 7 (Dec. 8, 1983)).
72. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57. The court noted several facts which aided it
in finding that the primary purpose of the discretionary self-tender was not to
entrench the directors. Id. at 956. First, the directors determined that the Unocal shares were worth more than the $54 per share offer in the front end of the
Mesa offer. Id. Second, the court noted that the back end of the Mesa offer
involved "junk bonds" worth far less than $54 per share. Id.
73. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956.
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court then found Unocal's self-tender to be an effective defensive tactic
because of the enormous debt which Unocal would incur as a result of
the self-tender.7 4 In addition, if Mesa's tender offer was successful, the
Unocal self-tender would assure that the remaining Unocal shareholders, who would have been forced to tender their shares in the second
tier of Mesa's two-tier tender offer, would receive adequate value for
75
their shares.
The court also found that the defensive measure was reasonable in
relation to the threat posed.7 6 In evaluating the threat, the court suggested that the following factors be considered: 1) the legality of the
tender offer; 2) the price of tender offer; and 3) the quality of the securities offered in the exchange. 7 7 The court found that the price per share
offered by Mesa in its tender offer, and the quality of the securities offered in the second tier were inadequate.78 Consequently, there was a
79
legitimate threat posed to the shareholders of Unocal.
In evaluating the reasonableness of the defensive tactic to meet the
threat, the court suggested that a target's board consider the interests of
the shareholders that were at stake.8 0 The court noted, however, that it
may be appropriate for a board to sacrifice the interests of one shareholder, who was a short-term speculator, for the interests of long-term
74. Id. Unocal's self-tender would have increased the corporation's debt by
$6.1-6.5 billion. Id. at 950.
75. Id. at 956. The second tier of Mesa's offer consisted of highly
subordinated debt securities with a face value of $54. Id. at 949. The court
characterized these securities as "junk bonds." Id. at 950. "Junk bonds" is a
phrase used to describe bonds for which the issuing company probably will not
be able to pay the face value. Id. These are high-risk, highly-subordinated
bonds. Id. at 949. The Unocal self-tender, on the other hand, consisted of senior debt securities with a par value of $72. Id. at 956. The court found that the
Unocal directors acted in the best interest of the corporation by issuing these
senior debt securities to protect the Unocal shareholders who would have had to
tender their shares in the second tier of Mesa's tender offer if the Unocal selftender was not available. Id.
76. Id. at 956-57.
77. Id. at 955. The court also suggested that the nature and timing of the
offer, the impact of the tender offer on constituencies other than shareholders,
and the risk that the tender offer may not materialize may be considered in evaluating the threat to the corporation. Id. The constituencies whom the court
suggested that the directors can consider protecting were: shareholders, creditors, customers, employees and possibly the community at large. Id. For a further discussion of the discretion which directors have to consider the impact of a
tender offer on constituencies other than shareholders, see supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
78. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950, 956. The court determined that the securities
which Mesa was offering in the back end of its two-tier offer were junk bonds. Id.
at 950.
79. Id. at 956. The court found that Mesa's tender offer was inadequate
and coercive. Id. at 950, 956.
80. Id. at 955-56. The court stated that the board should consider all shareholders, including the raider who was going to deprive the other shareholders of
the fair value for their shares. Id. at 956.
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investors who have remained loyal to the corporation. 8 1 Since Mesa was
82
a short-term speculator with a national reputation of "greenmailing,"
the court found that Unocal acted reasonably by using a defensive mea83
sure which aided all of the shareholders other than Mesa.
The Unocal court next addressed Mesa's assertion that the directors,
by excluding one shareholder from the self-tender, breached their obligation to treat all shareholders equally. 84 The court began by noting
that it had allowed a target's directors in the past to selectively repurchase shares in order to prevent a tender offeror from taking over the
target. 8 5 The court then reasoned that, because prior case law allows
81. Id. The court noted that the front end of Mesa's two-tier offer was $56
per share while the fair value of the shares exceeded $60 per share. Id. at 950,
956. In addition, the back end of the two-tier offer consisted of junk bonds
worth far less than $54. Id. at 956. The court recognized that this two-tier
tender offer was a "classic coercive measure by a short term speculator." Id. It
was designed to force shareholders to tender in the first tier, even if the price
was inadequate, in order to avoid being forced to receive less value in the second tier. Id. For a further discussion of the coercive nature of two-tier tender
offers, see supra note 55.
82. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. "Greenmailing" refers to the situation in
which a raider sells the target's shares which it owns to the target at a premium,
instead of continuing its pursuit to take over the target. Id. at n.13. The court
noted that Mesa is known nationally as a "greenmailer." Id. From 1982 through
1985, Mesa made 978 billion dollars through greenmailing activity with Supron,
Cities Services, General American Oil, Superior Oil, Gulf and Phillips Petroleum. High Times for T. Boone Pickens, TIME, Mar. 4, 1985, at 55. The Unocal court
also noted that Unocal's self-tender was a good faith attempt by the Unocal directors to eliminate the inadequacies of the Mesa tender offer and to avoid the
payment of greenmail. Unocal, 493 A.2d 956 n.13. Recently, Mesa announced
another takeover attempt in the oil industry. On December 3, 1986, Mesa made
an offer to acquire Diamond Shamrock. Blumenthal, Diamond Shamrock May Seek
a Suitorof Slate Stock Buyback to Thwart Mesa, Wall St. J., Dec. 4, 1986, at 4, col. 2.
Mesa, and its associate in the takeover attempt, owned 4.5% of Diamond Shamrock's stock at the time of the offer. Id. Market analysts are predicting that Diamond Shamrock will buy back a large portion of its shares at a premium to
counter this offer. Id. Mesa, it is suggested, will most likely participate in this
buyback and, once again, receive greenmail.
83. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. The court analogized a tender offer to a
merger. Id. at 956-57. In the merger context, a minority shareholder has a right
to receive securities of substantially equivalent value after the merger as those
he held before the merger. Id. at 956 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 304, 93 A.2d 107, 114 (1952)). The court felt that shareholders
in the takeover situation should have the same right. Id. at 956-57. The court
then concluded that Unocal's selective exchange offer would have assured Unocal shareholders other than Mesa of receiving a substantially equivalent value for
their shares if the Mesa tender offer was successful. Id.
84. Id. at 957-58. Mesa contended that the discriminatory tender offer violated the Unocal directors' fiduciary duty to treat all shareholders equally. Id. at
953. Specifically, Mesa argued that because other shareholders would derive a
financial benefit from which Mesa was excluded, Unocal could not sustain the
burden of proving that the exchange offer was fair to all shareholders. Id.
85. Id. at 957 (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548,
554 (1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 20-21, 187 A.2d 405, 408 (1962);
Martin v. American Potash & Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 245, 92 A.2d
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directors to favor one group of shareholders over the others if such action is in the best interest of the corporation, it is logical that the directors may favor shareholders other than the tender offeror so long as
such action is in the best interest of the corporation.8 6 Since Unocal's
offer favored all shareholders other than the tender offeror, the court
found that Unocal's selective exchange offer was a legitimate defensive
87
tactic.
The court concluded by noting that shareholders, such as Mesa,
have a right to act in their own best interest. 88 However, when a board
of directors finds that the shareholder's actions are inconsistent with the
best interests of the corporation, the directors have a right to protect the
89
corporation.
B.

Moran v. Household International, Inc.

The Delaware Supreme Court considered another defensive technique, the preferred share purchase rights plan (rights plan), in Moran v.
Household International,Inc.90 In Moran, the board of directors of House295, 302 (1952)). The Unocal court found it ironic that a corporation such as
Mesa would complain that it was not being treated the same as all other Unocal
shareholders. Id. at 957. The court noted that Mesa had made enormous profits
in the past when it accepted offers of greenmail that were not extended to any
other shareholders of the target. Id. While the court conceded that none of its
prior cases had sanctioned the use of defensive mechanisms to preclude a raider
from sharing in a benefit available to all other stockholders, it found that this
was a logical extension of its past decisions which allowed selective stock repurchases by a corporation. Id. The court suggested that simply because Delaware
corporate law is silent as to a specific matter, namely whether directors may take
action which favors other shareholders over a raider, does not mean that such
action is prohibited. Id.
86. Id. at 957. The court emphasized that corporate law is not static and
that it must develop in response to new developments in the corporate world.
Id.
87. Id. Even though some board members were large shareholders, the
court noted that this did not amount to a disqualifying pecuniary interest or
defeat the operation of the business judgment rule. Id. at 958.
88. Id. at 958 (citing Du Pont v. Du Pont, 251 F. 937, 944 (D. Del. 1918)
(shareholders do not stand in fiduciary relationship to corporation or other
shareholders and are free to exercise their right to vote as they desire), aft'd, 256
F. 129 (3d Cir. 1918); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v.
Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 617, 53 A.2d 441, 447 (1947) (not objectionable for
shareholders to exercise voting right in manner that maximizes personal profit);
Heil v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 17 Del. Ch. 214, 216, 151 A. 303, 304
(1930) (shareholders can exercise wide liberality in judgment)).
89. Id. According to the court, the board has not only a right, but also a
duty to defend against a takeover which is not in the best interest of the corporation. Id. at 954.
90. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Household International, Inc., the defendant-appellee, is a diversified holding company whose principal subsidiaries engage in financial services, transportation and merchandising. Id. at 1349. Three
of Household's wholly-owned subsidiaries are HFC, National Car Rental and
Vons Grocery. Id.
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hold International ("Household") adopted a rights plan which provided
each common shareholder with one "right" per common share if a certain triggering event should occur. 9 1 Two events would trigger the option: the announcement of a tender offer for thirty percent of
Household's shares 9 2 or the acquisition of twenty percent of Household's shares by a single entity. 93 Should one of these triggering events
occur and a successful tender offer result, each right would allow a
Household shareholder to acquire a share of the tender offeror at onehalf the market value of the share. 94 Moran, a director of Household
and chairman of D-K-M Corp., the largest Household shareholder,
brought suit along with D-K-M, to contest the validity of the rights
plan. 95
In evaluating the rights plan, the Moran court first considered
whether the Household directors had authority to adopt the plan under
Delaware law. 9 6 The court found that section 157 of the Delaware Cor91. Id. at 1349. Moran, the plaintiff-appellant, was one of two Household
International directors who had voted against the adoption of the rights plan.
Id. He, additionally, was the chairman of Dyson-Kissner-Moran Corp. (D-K-M)
which was the largest Household shareholder. Id. Both Moran and D-K-M
brought suit against Household International. Id.
92. Id. at 1348.
93. Id. According to the trial court, the "20% trigger" would occur if a person or group of persons acquired 20% of Household's common shares, had the
right to purchase 20% of Household's common shares, had the right to vote
20% of Household's shares, or announced the formation of a group of persons
holding 20% of Household's shares to act together. Moran, 490 A.2d 1059,
1066 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
94. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. The rights plan was designed so that should
an announcement of a tender offer for 30% of Household's shares be made, the
rights would issue and be immediately exercisable by Household shareholders
to purchase 1/100 share of new preferred stock for $100. Id. In this situation,
the rights would be redeemable by the Household Board for $.50 per right. Id.
Should 20% of Household's shares be acquired by anyone, the rights would
issue, become non-redeemable, and be exercisable to purchase 1/100 of a share
of preferred. Id.
Should a right not be exercised to purchase a preferred share and thereafter
a merger or consolidation occur, the rights holder would have the option of
exercising each right to purchase $200 of the common stock of the tender offeror for $100. Id. It was this "flipover" provision within the rights plan which
was central to the litigation because of its likelihood to discourage potential acquirors from making a tender offer for Household shares. Id. Such a rights plan
has been termed a "poison pill" defense. For a further discussion of the poison
pill defense used in Moran, see Comment, Delaware's Attempt to Swallow a New
Takeover Defense: The Poison Pill PreferredStock, 10 DEL. J. CORP. LAw 569 (1985);
Note, Delaware Serves Shareholders the "Poison Pill": Moran v. Household Interna-

tional, Inc., 27 B.C.L. REV. 641, 669 (1986) (concluding that court's decision, in
absence of specific threat to the corporation, is unduly lenient interpretation of
presumption in favor of directors under business judgment rule).
95. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349.
96. Id. at 1351. Moran and D-K-M made two major arguments regarding
the power of the Board to adopt the rights plan. Id. The first was that Delaware
corporate law does not authorize issuance of the rights. Id. For a discussion of
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porate Code authorizes such a plan. 97 Section 157 provides that "every
corporation may create and issue ...rights and options entitling the
[share]holders . . .to purchase from the corporation any shares of its
capital stock."'9 8 Although this provision had never been utilized in a
takeover situation, the court found that Delaware corporate law is dynamic and that section 157 could authorize a defensive mechanism. 99
Moran and D-K-M argued that section 157 only allows a corporation to
give a shareholder the right to purchase its own stock.' 0 0 The court,
however, chose not to adopt this literal interpretation.'10 Instead, the
court analogized the rights plan, which allowed shareholders of the target to purchase shares of the tender offeror at a reduced rate, 10 2 to an
"anti-dilution" provision.' 0 3 The purpose of an anti-dilution provision
is to allow shareholders of one corporation to convert their shares into
the court's response to this argument, see infra notes 97-109 and accompanying
text. The second argument, in which Moran and D-K-M were joined by the SEC,
was that the Board had no authority to usurp the opportunity of shareholders to
receive hostile tender offers. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351. For a discussion of the

court's response to this argument, see infra notes 110-12 and accompanying
text.
97. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-53.
98. Id. at 1351. Section 157 provides in pertinent part:

Subject to any provisions in the certificate of incorporation, every corporation may create and issue, whether or not in connection with the
issue and sale of any shares of stock or other securities of the corporation, rights or options entitling the holders thereof to purchase from
the corporation any shares of its capital stock of any class or classes,
such rights or options to be evidenced by or in such instrument or instruments as shall be approved by the board of directors.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (1983).

99. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351. The appellants argued that § 157 only pertained to the means by which a corporation could finance its endeavors. Id. The
appellant came to this conclusion because § 157 had been previously used only
in this context and because the legislative history only discusses § 157 in connection with corporate financing. Id. However, the court found that the legislative history does not limit the use of § 157 to corporate financing. Id. After
noting that the corporate law is not static, the court decided to apply § 157 in a
takeover setting. Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(1985)).
100. Id. Section 157 provides that a corporation may issue rights which allow a shareholder to purchase shares of "its capital stock." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 157 (1983) (emphasis added).
101. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352.
102. For a discussion of the intricacies of the rights plan, see supra notes 9395 and accompanying text.
103. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352. The appellant contended that § 157 only
applies to corporate financing. Id. at 1351. The appellant further contended
that "anti-dilution" provisions are valid only because they are incidental to a
corporation's right to finance itself through the issuance of various types of stock
under § 157. Id. However, the appellant contended that the rights plan is not
valid since it is not incidental to a corporation's right to finance itself. Id. The
court found no merit in the appellant's distinction. Id. It did not accept Household's basic premise that § 157 only applies to corporate financing as it could
find no support for this premise in the legislative history or in prior case law. Id.
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shares of another corporation in the event that the two corporations
merge. 1 4 Because it had approved anti-dilution provisions in the past,
the Delaware Supreme Court found that the rights plan also should be
approved. 105
The court then rejected Moran's and D-K-M's contention that the
Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause would be violated if it interpreted section 157 to authorize the rights plan. 10 6 Noting that the
104. Id. at 1352. The following is an example of an "anti-dilution"
provision:

If any capital reorganization or reclassification of the capital stock of
the Company, or consolidation or merger of the Company with another
corporation, or the sale of all or substantially all of its assets to another
corporation, shall be effected in such a way that holders of Common
Stock shall be entitled to receive stock, securities or assets with respect
to or in exchange for Common Stock, then, as a condition of such reorganization, reclassification, consolidation, merger or sale, the Company
or such successor purchasing corporation, as the case may be, shall execute with the Trustee a supplemental indenture providing that the
Holder of each Debenture then Outstanding shall have the right thereafter and until the expiration of the period of convertibility to convert
such Debenture into the kind and amount of stock securities or assets
receivable upon such reorganizations, reclassification, consolidation,
merger or sale by a holder of the number of shares of Common Stock
into which such Debenture might have been converted immediately
prior to such reorganization, reclassification, consolidation, merger or
sale, subject to adjustments which shall be as nearly equivalent as may
be practicable to the adjustments provided for in this Article Thirteen.
549-50 (1971).
105. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352 (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642
F.2d 929, 946 (5th Cir.) (purpose of anti-dilution provisions is to protect shareholders' pre-existing rights), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Wood v. Coastal
State Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 937-39 (Del. 1979) (anti-dilution provisions ap-

AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON INDENTURE,

propriate in conversion contracts which allow shareholder to convert one type of
shares into another); B.S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 204 A.2d 746, 75051 (Del. 1964) (provisions which allow shareholders to exercise preexisting

rights before consolidation or merger are lawful)). For a critical analysis of the
court's use of these three cases, see infra notes 241-48 and accompanying text.
106. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353. The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have Power .. . [t]o regulate Commerce . .. among the several
States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supremacy Clause provides that "the
laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI. The appellant argued that an interpretation of § 157 which allowed for the rights plan would render § 157 unconstitutional under both the
Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause because such an interpretation
would be contrary to the purpose of a federal statute, the Williams Act. Id.; see
Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976)). The purpose of the Williams Act is to require full disclosure of the facts surrounding a tender offer to the shareholders of the target so
that they can make an informed decision about whether they should tender their
shares. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 033-34 (1981) (legislative purpose for Williams Act was to provide sufficient information to shareholders so
that they can make educated decisions). When Congress enacted the Williams
Act, it specifically stated that it did not want to favor either the raider or the
target in the takeover battle. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967)

(Congress chose not to discourage takeover bids because "they serve a useful
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Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause could be violated only if
there was "state action," 10 7 the court found that the Household directors, acting pursuant to a state statute, did not provide a sufficient nexus
to the state for there to be "state action." 10 8 Consequently, there could
not be a violation of the Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause. 109
purpose of providing a check on entrenched but ineffective management"); H.R.
REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. 4, reprintedin 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2811, 2813 ("bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor
of management or in favor of person making the takeover bid"); see also Rondeau
v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58-59 (1975) (Congress adopted policy of
neutrality). Because an interpretation of § 157 which allows for the implementation of the rights plan by the target would clearly favor the target, the appellants
argued that such an interpretation was contrary to the Williams Act and, therefore, void under the Supremacy Clause. Brief for Appellants at 46, Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
107. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353. For instance, in Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457
U.S. 624 (1981), the United States Supreme Court found that the Illinois Business Takeover Act violated the Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution because it placed an undue burden on the tender offeror which was
inconsistent with one of the purposes of the Williams Act. Edgar, 457 U.S. at
634-46. The Williams Act was enacted with the intention of not putting an excessive burden on either the tender offeror or the target. H.R. REP. No. 1711,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811,
2813. The Illinois statute put an unconstitutionally excessive burden on the
tender offeror as it required the tender offeror to give notice of its intent to
make an offer and to appear at a hearing before the state secretary of state who
could block the tender offer. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 634-40.
108. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353 (citing Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1983) (acts of private corporation in takeover context do not constitute state action). The court found that Edgar v. Mite
Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), which invalidated the Illinois Business Takeover Act
as an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, was not controlling because it applied only to state action. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353.
109. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352. The Delaware Supreme Court dismissed
two other contentions of the appellants. Id. They alleged that the rights plan
was a sham and that § 157 does not authorize the issuance of rights which are
designed never to be exercised. Id. at 1351-52. The Moran court rejected this
contention, noting that if one of the triggering events occurred, the Household
shareholders could exercise their rights to purchase stock of the tender offeror
at a reduced rate. Id. at 1352. The court supported this statement by citing a
recent tender offer battle in which the shareholders of the target exercised their
rights. Id. (citing Goldsmith Wins Fight for Crown Zellerbach Corp., WALL ST. J., July
29, 1985, at 3, col. 1) (Sir James Goldsmith's successful takeover of Crown
Zellerbach)).
The appellants also alleged that allowing the rights plan under § 157 is contrary to § 203 of the Delaware Corporate Code. Id.; see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 203 (1983). Section 203 is a "notice statute" which requires a tender offeror
to give timely notice to the target if it intends to make a tender offer. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1983). Section 203 provides in pertinent part:
No offeror shall make a tender offer unless . . .not less than 20 nor
more than 60 days before the date the tender offer is to be made, the
offeror shall deliver personally or by registered or certified mail to the
corporation whose equity securities are to be subject to the tender offer
...a written statement of the offeror's intention to make the tender
offer ....
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The Moran court next considered whether the plan usurped the
shareholders' right to receive tender offers. I10 The court found that the
rights plan did not prohibit tender offers since there were several ways
for a potential raider to circumvent the rights plan,"' noting, i fact,
that a raider had recently taken over a target corporation with a rights
t2
plan similar to that of Household."
After deciding that the directors had authority to implement the
rights plan, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the directors had exercised their authority appropriately under the business judgId. The appellants contended that the legislature intended for there to be no
greater impediment to the takeover process than the notice requirement since
the legislature enacted § 203 and not a more restrictive provision. Moran, 500
A.2d at 1353. The court rejected this line of reasoning, stating that the legislature's failure to enact more restrictive statutes governing the tender offer process does not indicate a legislative intent that there be no private regulation of
the process such as the rights plan. Id.
110. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353-55. The appellants alleged that the rights
plan prevented the shareholder from receiving tender offers because it altered
the fundamental structure of the corporation. Id. at 1353-54. The court rejected this reasoning on two grounds. Id. at 1354. First, it listed several ways
that shareholders could receive tender offers while avoiding the operation of the
rights plan. Id. For a discussion of the ways that shareholders can receive tender
offers while the rights plan is in place, see infra note 111.
Second, the court stated that a rights plan has a less significant effect on
Household's structure than would other defensive mechanisms. 500 A.2d at
1354. For instance, a rights plan does less harm to the value of a corporation
than does the "scorched earth" defense under which the target sells its prize
assets in order to deter the tender offeror from continuing its bid for the target.
Id. (citing Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982)). The
rights plan also is less harmful than "greenmailing", a process by which the target pays the tender offeror a price above market value for the target's shares
which the tender offeror has acquired in order to eliminate the tender offeror as
a threat. Id. (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964)).
Finally, as the court noted, the rights plan is less damaging than a discriminatory self-tender under which a target offers to acquire its own shares, from all
shareholders other than the tender offeror, at a higher price than that offered by
the tender offeror in order to assure that the tender offeror is not able to acquire
those shares and, consequently, obtain control of the target. Id. (citing Unocal,
493 A.2d at 946).
111. Id. at 1354. The court suggested several ways that a raider could acquire a target which has a rights plan. Id. First, one could make a tender offer
contingent upon the target's board redeeming the rights. Id. Second, one could
make a tender offer contingent upon receiving a very large percentage of the
target's shares and the corresponding rights. Id. This would reduce the negative
impact of the rights plan since there would only be a minimal number of shareholders who could exercise the right and thereby obtain shares in the tender
offeror at a reduced rate. Id. Last, one could obtain an amount of shares just
below that amount which triggers the issuance of the rights plan and then attempt to solicit proxies from other shareholders to remove the target's board of
directors and abolish the rights plan. Id.
112. Id. The court noted that Sir James Goldsmith successfully took over
Crown Zellerbach even though Crown Zellerbach had enacted a rights plan similar to that of Household. Id. (citing Goldsmith Wins Fightfor Crown Zellerbach Corp.,
WALL ST. J., July 29, 1985, at 3, col. 1).
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ment rule." 13 The court reiterated its finding in Unocal, that the initial
burden is on the directors who employ the defensive mechanism to
prove: 1) that they acted in good faith and made a reasonable investigation before adopting the defensive mechanism" 14 and 2) that the defensive mechanism was reasonable in relation to the threat posed." l5 The
court noted that the members of the Household board had held extensive discussions among themselves about the advantages and disadvantages of the plan and sought the advice of outside consultants who
6
prepared reports about the merit of the tender offer for the board."l
Thus, the court concluded that the Household board made a well-in7
formed decision.' 1
Although there was no immediate threat of a hostile takeover, the
Moran court found that Household's board met the burden of showing
that the defensive measure adopted was reasonable in relation to the
threat posed."l 8 The court based its conclusion on evidence in the record concerning the increasing frequency of hostile takeovers in the financial services industry and the pervasive use of coercive two-tier
tender offers, which often force some of the target's shareholders to accept valueless securities in exchange for their shares in the target corporation.' 19 Accordingly, the court found that the Household board
113. Id. at 1355-57.
114. Id. at 1356 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955 (Del. 1985)).
115. Id. The court noted that proof of the directors meeting their initial
burden is "materially enhanced" where a majority of the board that approved
the defensive mechanism consists of independent directors who acted in good
faith and after reasonable investigation. Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815
(Del. 1984)). Household's board consisted of 10 outside, independent directors
and 6 directors who were members of management. Id. at 1348 n.2.
116. Id. at 1356. Representatives of the New York law firm of Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen and Katz provided the board with an opinion that the rights plan
fell within the board's powers under the business judgment rule. Id. Moran, the
appellant in the case and a member of Household's board, presented the negative aspects of the rights plan to the board. Id. Consequently, the court concluded that the board was well-informed as to the advantages and disadvantages
of the plan. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1356-57. The Delaware Supreme Court first introduced the concept of balancing the reasonableness of the defensive measure against the threat
posed by the tender offer in Unocal. In Unocal, there was a tender offeror who
was attempting to take over the target. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985). In Moran, there was no immediate threat of a
hostile takeover. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. However, the Delaware Supreme
Court still found that the Household board's implementation of the rights plan
as a defensive mechanism was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Id.
The court stated that the increased frequency of takeovers in Household's industry (financial services) was a sufficient threat for the Household board to employ the rights plan in an effort to guard against a hostile acquisition. Id.
119. Id. An example of the second tier of a two-tier offer forcing the shareholders of the target to receive valueless securities can be found in Unocal Corp.
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adopted a reasonable response to the threat of a hostile tender offer
and, therefore, deserved the protection of the business judgment
20

rule. 1

C.

Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc.

In Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc. M21
the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated the use of a lock-up
option to prevent a takeover attempt by an unfriendly suitor.' 22 Hanson
Trust PLC ("Hanson Trust") attempted to take over SCM Corporation
(SCM) by making a sixty dollar per share cash tender offer for any and
all shares of SCM.1 2 3 The SCM directors chose to defend against the

tender offer by entering into a leveraged buyout agreement with Merrill
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., where the court labeled the second tier securities as
"junk bonds." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950. For a discussion of the coercive nature
of two-tier tender offers, see supra note 55; see also Finkelstein, supra note 55 at
293 (noting that shareholders are pressured to tender shares in first tier for fear
of receiving less value, such as junk bonds, in second tier); Lipton, supra note 18,
at 113-14 (wise investor almost forced to tender shares in first of two tiers).
120. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. The court concluded its decision by noting
that the Household board could not blindly activate the rights under the rights
plan should it be confronted with an actual takeover bid. Id. The board still had
a duty to the corporation and the shareholders to consider their best interests
when deciding whether to activate the rights plan or to abolish the rights plan
and accept the tender offer. Id. at 1357. Should a board choose to activate a
rights plan, it must meet the Unocal test for defensive mechanisms. Id. For a
discussion of the Unocal test, see supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
121. 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 283. The plaintiffs in the case were Hanson Trust PLC and three
of its wholly owned subsidiaries: HSCM Industries Inc., Hanson Holding
Netherlands B.V., and HMAC Investments Inc. Id. at 264. Hanson Trust PLC is
a corporation organized under the laws of the United Kingdom. Id. at 268.
HSCM Industries Inc. and HMAC Investments Inc. are incorporated under the
laws of Delaware. Id. Hanson Holdings Netherlands B.V. is a limited liability
company incorporated under the laws of the Netherlands. Id. One defendant
and the target of the takeover attempt, SCM Corporation, is a highly diversified
corporation organized under the laws of New York. Id. at 267. SCM has divisions in the following areas: chemicals, coating and resins, paper products, food
and typewriters. Id. Pigments, a subdivision of SCM's Chemical division, and
Durkee Famous Foods, a subdivision of its Foods division, accounted for approximately 50% of SCM's net generating income in recent years and were considered by Hanson Trust to be the "crown jewels" of SCM. Id. SCM entered
into a lock-up option with Merrill Lynch which allowed Merrill Lynch to acquire
these "crown jewels" if Hanson Trust or any other third party acquired one
third of SCM's common stock. Id. at 270. The district court had found that it
was permissible for the SCM directors to employ the lock-up option under New
York's business judgment rule. Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp.
848, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The Second Circuit reversed the district court, holding that such an agreement violated the directors' duty to obtain the maximum
price possible for the shareholders' stock because it stifles, instead of promotes,
bidding. 781 F.2d at 282-83.
123. Id. at 268. Hanson Trust made a $60 cash tender offer for any and all
shares of SCM. Id. at 268. During the month prior to the tender offer, the SCM
stock was trading at less than $50 per share. Id.
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Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ("Merrill Lynch") under which Merrill Lynch would make a seventy dollar per share cash tender offer for
eighty-five percent of SCM's shares. 124 In response, Hanson Trust
raised its offer to seventy-two dollars per share, conditioned on SCM's
refraining from granting a lock-up option to anyone seeking control of
SCM. 12 5 SCM and Merrill Lynch then negotiated a new offer, under
which Merrill Lynch would make a seventy-four dollar per share cash
tender offer.12 6 In consideration for raising the tender offer price, SCM
agreed to grant Merrill Lynch an option to purchase its two most profit127
able divisions if any third party acquired one-third of the SCM stock.
124. Id. at 269. The leveraged buyout agreement was to be accomplished
through Merrill Lynch and its related entities, including ML SCM Acquisition

Inc., Merrill Lynch Capitol Partners, Merrill Lynch Capitol Markets and Merrill

Lynch & Co. Under the leveraged buyout agreement, Merrill Lynch would make
a two-tier tender offer for all of the SCM shares. Id. In the first tier, Merrill
Lynch would offer to purchase 10.5 million (85%) of the SCM shares for $59.50
in cash and $10.50 in debentures. Id. This would be followed by a second tier,
in which the remaining shareholders could exchange their shares for high risk,
high yield, subordinated debentures (junk bonds) valued at $70 per share. Id. If
the shareholders did not wish to participate in the second tier, they could settle
for their appraisal rights under New York statutory law. Id. (citing N.Y. Bus.
CORP. L. § 623 (McKinney 1983) (setting forth procedure shareholder must use
to demand that corporation pays shareholder fair value for shares if corporation
takes action to which shareholder objects)). The agreement also provided that
SCM would pay Merrill Lynch an engagement fee ("hello fee") of $1.5 million.
Id. at 269. A target uses this type of fee to get a "white knight" to enter an
agreement that will protect the corporation from the raider. Id. SCM also
agreed to pay Merrill Lynch a break-up fee ("goodbye fee") of $9 million. Id.
These fees are paid to a "white knight" if the merger does not materialize. Id. In
this case, the break-up fee was to be payable if any third party acquired one-third
of the outstanding shares of SCM, an amount sufficient under New York law to
block the Merrill Lynch-SCM merger. Id.
125. Id. at 270.
126. Id. Merrill Lynch's increased offer, however, was deceiving. Id. The
offer allowed SCM shareholders to exchange their shares for $59.20 in cash and
$14.80 in debentures. Id. Thus, the shareholders received 30 cents per share
less in cash than they would have received in the previous leverage buyout
agreement. Id. In addition, SCM agreed to pay Merrill Lynch an additional $6
million as a "hello again" fee for increasing its offer. Id.
One further aspect of the leveraged buyout agreement was that the managing directors of SCM had the right to become equity participants in the corporation that resulted from the leveraged buyout. Id. at 269. The court noted the
importance of the independent directors in this type of situation, suggesting that
the independent directors must protect the interests of the shareholders because
it is unreasonable to think that the managing directors, with a financial interest
in the buyout, would consider solely the best interest of the shareholders when
determining the options available in a tender offer situation. Id. at 277 (citing
inter alia, Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (Summer
1985) (social and psychological pressures prevent managerial directors from objectively considering merits of tender offer and, thus, some commentators have
suggested that independent directors act as safeguards for interests of
shareholders)).
127. Id. at 267. Pigments and Durkee Famous Foods were the two entities
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Hanson Trust then terminated its seventy-two dollar per share tender
offer and brought suit against SCM in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York to enjoin the exercise of the lockup option. 128 Hanson Trust also declared its intention to make a seventy-five dollar per share tender offer for all outstanding shares of SCM,
conditioned on the withdrawal or judicial invalidation of the lock-up
29
option. 1

In determining the validity of the lock-up option, the Second Circuit began by discussing the operation of the business judgment rule in
the takeover context.130 Contrary to Delaware law, the court noted that
directors enjoy a presumption of propriety under New York law, with
the burden of proof on the plaintiff to show that the implementation of a
13 1
defensive mechanism is a breach of the directors' fiduciary duty.
Once a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty, the burden shifts to the directors to prove
32
the fairness of the defensive mechanism. 1
The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in finding that
Hanson Trust failed to make a prima facie showing that the SCM directors breached their fiduciary duty.' 33 The Second Circuit found that the
SCM directors breached their duty of care which required them to use
reasonable diligence to acquire material information about a takeover
and to make a reasonable inquiry into the information obtained.' 3 4 As
involved in the lock-up option. Id. at 270. Pigments was a subdivision of SCM's
chemical division while Durkee Famous Foods was a subdivision of its foods division. Id. at 267. The option price for Pigments was $350 million and the option
price for Durkee Famous Foods was $80 million. Id.
128. Id. at 272. The district court denied Hanson Trust's request for a preliminary injunction against the use of the lock-up option, finding that under New
York law the lock-up option was "part of a viable business strategy." Hanson
Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 623 F. Supp. 848, 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
129. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 272.
130. Id. The Second Circuit noted that the directors have a fiduciary duty to
the shareholders and that it must decide whether the directors' conduct in reaction to Hanson Trust's tender offer breached that duty. Id. The court continued
by stating that the business judgment rule "bars judicial inquiry into actions of
corporate directors taken in good faith and in the exercise of honest judgment in
the lawful and legitimate furtherance of corporate purposes." Id. at 273 (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926, 393
N.E.2d 994, 1000 (1979)).
131. Id. at 273. The court compared New York law with Delaware law,
under which the initial burden is on the directors in a takeover situation to show
that they had reasonable grounds for believing that the takeover would endanger corporate policy. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985).
132. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 272. The court observed that absent a showing of a breach of fiduciary duty, directors have "wide latitude in devising strategies to resist unfriendly [takeover] advances." Id. at 273 (quoting Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1984)).
133. Id. at 267.
134. Id. at 273. The court stated that, under the duty of care analysis, the
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to the first aspect, the court found that the directors, in one late night
session, decided to grant Merrill Lynch the lock-up option without full
knowledge as to the true value of the corporation, the type of event
which would trigger the lock-up option, and the kind of corporation
SCM would be without its two most lucrative divisions.' 3 5 As to the
second aspect, the court determined that the directors failed to inquire
about the basis for their outside consultant's conclusory statements rel 6
garding the fairness and benefits of the leveraged buyout.1
Having concluded that Hanson successfully shifted the burden to
SCM, the court then considered the reasons which SCM gave in defense
directors enjoy a presumption that they acted appropriately. Id. The duty of
care requires the directors to act with "conscientious fairness." Id. at 274 (citing
Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 554, 569, 483 N.E.2d 19, 26, 483
N.Y.S.2d 667, 674 (1984) ("all corporate responsibilities must be discharged in
good faith and with conscientious fairness, morality ....

honesty in purpose...

[and] candor")). Put more simply, the duty of care requires the directors to

make an informed decision. Id. at 284 (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01 (c)(2)

(Tent. Draft No. 4, April 12, 1985) ("informed with respect to the subject of his
business judgment to the extent he reasonably believes to be appropriate under
the circumstances"); H. BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 63a at 161 (rev.
ed. 1946) ("presupposed that reasonable diligence and care have been exercised"); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 111
(1979) (business judgment rule should not be available to directors who do "not
exercise due care to ascertain the relevant and available facts before voting")).
135. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 275. The court noted that the directors had
never asked what the top value of the two optioned divisions was, nor did they
inquire as to why the divisions were being sold for one-third of the total
purchase price of the entire company under the leveraged buyout agreement
when they generated one-half of the corporation's income. Id. Nor did the directors discuss with financial advisors the viability of the corporation without its
two most lucrative divisions. Id. The court rejected SCM's argument that the
circumstances required the directors to make an emergency decision, pointing
out that the delay in Hanson's acquisition efforts required by the federal securities law provided SCM with time which should have been used for more thorough investigation of defense options. Id.
The directors also alleged that they were a "working board" which was familiar with SCM and, consequently, that they could enter the leveraged buyout
agreement without making further inquiries of their financial analyst. Id. The
Second Circuit questioned the directors' familiarity with SCM since they did not
find the prices for which the two divisions were being sold to be lower than the
fair market value of the divisions. Id. The directors' investment banker and
other sources had suggested to the directors that the divisions were more valuable than the price stated in the leveraged buyout agreement. Id.
136. Id. at 275-76. The court stated that directors have an obligation to
become reasonably familiar with an advisor's report or opinion before they are
entitled to rely on it. Id. at 275. The fact that the directors did not request
documents to support the opinions of their financial advisors as to the "range of
fair value" of the assets to be sold and, thus, did not discover that their advisors
had not actually calculated that range, served to indicate that the directors had
not met their duty. Id. at 276. Furthermore, a remark by one advisor that an
"orderly sale" of assets could bring higher prices than those negotiated with
Merrill Lynch, should have led to further investigation by the board. Id.
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of the leveraged buyout agreement. 137 The directors contended that
the valuation of the two divisions was appropriate and, thus, that it was
in the best interest of the shareholders to enter into the leveraged
buyout agreement with Merrill Lynch. 13 8 The court rejected this contention because the method of evaluation' 3 9 and the information used
40
in the valuation were suspect.'
The SCM board also asserted that the primary purpose of the lockup option was to obtain the best bid for the SCM shareholders. 14 1 The
court stated that the test for determining the primary purpose of a director's actions is whether the action "objectively" benefits the shareholders. 14 2 Viewing the leveraged buyout agreement, which contained the
137. Id. at 277-83.
138. Id. at 277-78.
139. Id. at 278. The $350 million option price for Pigments, a figure which
SCM suggested was the proper valuation of the division, was based solely on the
division's earnings for 1985 and 1986. Id. Pigments' actual earnings for 1985
were lower than they had been in the past ten years. Id. In addition, the division's projected earnings for 1986 were at their lowest in ten years. Id. Thus,
the court felt that 1985 and 1986 did not adequately reflect the earning potential
and, thus, the value of the division. Id.
140. Id. SCM attempted to show that a calculation of Rothschild, Inc., Hanson Trust's investment bank, accurately represented the value of the Pigments
division. Id. This calculation estimated the value of Pigments at $345 million.
Id. The court rejected this calculation because it was based on incomplete data
and without full knowledge of the operating income of the Pigments division.
Id. at 278-79. In fact, Rothschild later valued the Pigments division between
$450 and $500 million, a price far above the $350 million offered by Merrill
Lynch, in the leveraged buyout agreement, after learning of the Pigments division's actual operating income. Id. at 279. Furthermore, SCM's own investment
banker at Goldman Sachs & Co. testified at the injunction hearing that the value
of the Pigments division was between $420 and $544 million. Id. Two other
investment bankers also valued the Pigments division in this range during the
injunction hearing. Id. The Second Circuit noted that even accepting the lowest
of all the estimates, $420 million, it would still suggest a $70 million undervaluation by SCM in the optioned price at which Pigments was offered. Id.
The court further concluded that, in optioning the Durkee Famous Foods
division for $80 million, the SCM directors had considerably undervalued the
division. Id. at 280. At the injunction hearing, Hanson Trust produced evidence
that Borden Corp. was interested in purchasing the division for $105 million and
that Merrill Lynch itself hoped to receive $125 million in selling the division. Id.
Deposition testimony of representatives of SCM, Merrill Lynch, Prudential Insurance Co., Goldman Sachs & Co., and Bear, Stearns & Co., furthermore
placed the value of Durkee Famous Foods at a range between $90 and $110
million. Id. On the basis of the evidence as to the undervaluation of both the
Pigments and the Durkee Famous Foods divisions, the Second Circuit concluded
that the district court erred in failing to consider this evidence in deciding Hanson Trust's motion for a preliminary injunction to restrain the exercise of the
lock-up option. Id.
141. Id. at 281.
142. Id. In support of this test, the court cited N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 717
(McKinney 1983) (imposing on directors an "ordinary prudent person" standard); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266 (2d Cir. 1984)
(directors must act in best interest of corporation and its shareholders); MacAn-
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lock-up option, as a whole, the court found that the agreement did not
benefit the shareholders. 14 3 By accepting the Merrill Lynch offer, the
directors obtained two dollars per share in excess of the Hanson Trust
offer, but at the cost of a six million dollar "hello again" fee 44 and an
option to purchase SCM's two major divisions at a price well below their
fair value. 145
drews and Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1250 (Del. Ch.
1985) ("objective needs of shareholders"), aft'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 21, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962) (directors can take
actions "primarily in the corporate interest").
143. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281. The court stated that the directors
pointed to little or no evidence to support a finding that they acted in the best
interests of the shareholders. Id. The court further stated that evidence of directors' good intentions is not sufficient to justify a lock-up option, which is inherently suspect because it forecloses bidding. Id. (citing Thompson v. Enstar,
Nos. 7641, 7643 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 1984), reprinted in 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 822
(1984)). The court noted finally that the district court had determined that the
directors knew or should have known that the lock-up option would end the
bidding process. Id.
144. Id. at 270. The "hello again" fee was demanded by Merrill Lynch as
an inducement to resume negotiations after the first leveraged buyout agreement had been terminated. Id. When the negotiation initially began between
SCM and Merrill Lynch, SCM paid Merrill Lynch a "hello" fee of $1.5 million.
Id. at 269. Thus, coupled with the $6 million "hello again" fee, SCM paid Merrill Lynch $7.5 million for entering the leveraged buyout agreements to prohibit
Hanson Trust from acquiring SCM. Id. at 269-70. For a discussion of "hello
fees" and "good-bye fees," see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
145. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281-82. The court noted that the leveraged
buyout will only be economically useful to the shareholders if SCM merges with
Merrill Lynch and the emerging entity is financially sound. Id. at 282. Under
New York law, Merrill Lynch must acquire two-thirds of the shares of SCM
before the two companies can merge. Id. at 267 (citing N.Y. Bus. L. § 903(a)(2)
(McKinney 1983)). Should Merrill Lynch acquire two-thirds of the SCM shares,
those shareholders who tendered their shares to Merrill Lynch in the first tier of
the two-tier tender offer would receive a joint debt and equity security. Id. at
270. If the emerging entity is not financially sound, it will not be able to pay the
value of the debenture (debt) portion of the security. Id. at 282. In addition, the
front end of Merrill Lynch's offer only extended to 80% of the shares of SCM;
therefore, shareholders holding 20% of SCM's shares would be required to exchange their shares in the back end of the offer for high risk debentures. Id. at
270. If the emerging company is not financially sound, it will not be able to pay
the face value of the debentures. Id. at 282. Thus, if Merrill Lynch and SCM
merge, the former SCM shareholders only would benefit if the emerging corporation was financially sound and, therefore, able to pay the full value of the debentures. Id.
In the event that Merrill Lynch and SCM did not merge because a corporation other than Merrill Lynch acquired one-third of the SCM stock, the lock-up
provision in the leveraged buyout agreement would allow Merrill Lynch to acquire the two SCM divisions. Id. at 270. If this were to occur, the remaining
SCM shareholders would be left with effectively only one-half of the corporation
that they had prior to the takeover struggle since they would lose their two most
profitable divisions. Id. at 282. Moreover, the shareholders would not receive
adequate consideration for the portion of the corporation that they lost since the
court determined that the price for the divisions in the option provision was less
than the actual value of the divisions. Id. at 282. Lastly, SCM's treasury would
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Finally, the court rejected SCM's argument that the leveraged
buyout offer enhanced the competition for control of SCM.

14 6

The

lock-up option prevented Hanson Trust and any other potential bidder
from making a tender offer for shares of SCM because if the tender offeror acquired enough shares to trigger the lock-up option, Merrill
Lynch would obtain SCM's two most profitable divisions at a below market price. 14 7 This would leave the tender offeror with a significant
number of shares in a "denuded" corporation.1 4 8 The court concluded
that a preliminary injunction preventing SCM from exercising the lockup option was appropriate, given the serious questions raised by Hanson Trust about the directors' failure to meet their duty of care and the
potential for irreparable harm to the SCM shareholders.1 49
In his dissent, Judge Kearse objected to the majority's substantive
50
interpretation of the business judgment rule under New York law.'
Judge Kearse noted that the business judgment rule requires directors
to act in good faith, without fraud, and without self-dealing. 1 1 The
majority had conceded that the directors did not breach any of these
duties. 15 2 In addition, Judge Kearse noted that the business judgment
rule requires directors to exercise reasonable diligence when making
be depleted because $16.5 million in fees would have been paid by SCM to Merrill Lynch: "hello fees" totaling $7.5 million and a "breakup fee" of $9 million.
Id. at 269, 282 & n. 12. Thus, if the merger was not successful because an entity
other than Merrill Lynch acquired one-third of the SCM shares, the leveraged
buyout agreement and the lock-up option would injure the SCM shareholders
significantly. Id. at 282.
For a discussion of the problems facing a corporation that emerges out of a
difficult takeover battle, see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of purchase prices for the two divisions involved in the lock-up option
and disagreement over the valuation, see supra note 127.
146. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 282. The court noted that this argument was
flawed since it assumed that a competing bidder was not handicapped by the
existence of a lock-up option. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 283. The court noted that the triggering of the lock-up option
would impose the greatest hardship on Hanson Trust, which is the largest minority shareholder of SCM. Id. at 282-83. If the option was triggered, Hanson
Trust would hold one-third of the "denuded company," namely, SCM without
its two most profitable assets, the Pigments and Durkee Famous Foods subdivisions, which generated 50% of SCM's income. Id. at 282. For a further discussion of the effect of the lock-up option being exercised, see supra note 145.
149. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 283.
150. Id. at 285-87 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse noted that one of
the premises for the business judgment rule is that the courtroom is not the
appropriate forum to scrutinize decisions made in a corporate boardroom. Id. at
286 (Kearse, J., dissenting) (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629-3 1,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979)).
151. Id. at 286-87 (Kearse,J., dissenting). Judge Kearse stated that the law
presumes that directors have acted in good faith unless the party challenging
their decision proves to the contrary. Id.
152. Id. at 274. The majority stated: "It is not enough that directors
merely be disinterested and thus not disposed to self-dealing or other indicia of
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their judgments. 153 Judge Kearse noted that New York statutory law

allows directors to rely on opinions and statements of expert advisors to
the corporation. 154 Since the directors acted consistently with the law
by relying on their advisor's determination of the value of the divisions,
Judge Kearse found that the directors met their duty to exercise reasonable diligence. 155 Thus, he concluded that the directors had acted
15 6
within their scope of authority under the business judgment rule.
D. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &Forbes Holdings, Inc., 15 7 the Delaware
Supreme Court, in its latest proclamation on defenses to corporate takeovers, addressed the legitimacy of a number of defensive tactics. 158 In
Revlon, a representative of Pantry Pride, Inc. 159 approached Revlon, Inc.
with the hope of making a friendly acquisition of Revlon for forty to fifty
dollars per share. 160 The Revlon directors thought the offer inadea breach of the duty of loyalty. Directors are also held to a standard of due
care." Id.
153. Id. at 287 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse stated that the directors enjoy a presumption that they exercised reasonable diligence in reaching
their decision. Id. (citing Treadways Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
154. Id. at 287 (KearseJ., dissenting). Section 717 of the New YoAk Business Code provides, in pertinent part:
In performing his duties, a director shall be entitled to rely on information,
opinion, reportsor statements including financial statements and other data,
in each case prepared or presented by... counsel, public accountants or other

persons as to matters which the director believes to be within such person's professional or expert competence....
N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 717 (McKinney Supp. 1984) (emphasis added).

155. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 287 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse
noted that although the district court hinted that it would have defended against
the takeover in a manner other than that chosen by the directors, it recognized
that, under New York law, the directors were entitled to rely on their advisor's
opinion when entering into the leveraged buyout agreement. Id. (Kearse, J.,
dissenting).
156. Id. at 291 (Kearse, J., dissenting). Judge Kearse believed that the directors complied with their duties under the business judgment rule and, therefore, he would have denied Hanson Trust's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Id. In sum, Judge Kearse found that the district court properly applied New
York's substantive law on the business judgment rule and that the district court's
findings of fact were not clearly erroneous. Id. at 285-91 (KearseJ., dissenting).
157. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
158. Id.
159. Id. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. is the controlling shareholder of Pantry Pride, Inc. Id. at 175 n.l. For all practical purposes, Pantry
Pride is the defendant in the case. Id. at 175.
160. Id. at 176. The chairman of the board and chief executive officer of
Pantry Pride, Ronald 0. Perelman, met with his counterpart at Revlon, Michel
C. Bergerac. Id. Bergerac rebuffed all overtures by Perelman, based perhaps, as
the court suggested, on Bergerac's strong personal antipathy to Perelman. Id.
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quate' 6 l and employed a combination of defensive tactics to deter Pantry Pride. 162 Revlon first repurchased five million of its thirty million
shares 163 and thereafter enacted a rights plan, which enabled Revlon
shareholders to exchange their shares of common stock for sixty-five
dollar notes, if anyone acquired twenty percent or more of Revlon's
shares. 64
Undaunted by Revlon's defensive maneuvers, Pantry Pride made a
forty-seven dollar and fifty cent tender offer for any and all of Revlon's
1 65
common shares, conditioned upon the rights plan being revoked.
Once again, the Revlon directors thought this offer inadequate and
made a self-tender for an additional ten million shares. 166 In connection with the self-tender, the board created certain covenants to deter
any potential raiders. 16 7 These covenants severely limited Revlon's
161. Id. Bergerac dismissed the $40 to $50 per share offer by Perelman as
considerably below Revlon's intrinsic value. Id.
162. Id. at 176-77. The Revlon board met specifically to consider the threat
from Pantry Pride. Id. At the meeting, Revlon's investment banker, Lazard
Fr~res, informed the board that Pantry Pride's offer was grossly inadequate and
suggested that Revlon take defensive measures to combat the threat. Id. at 177.
Martin Lipton, an attorney with the New York law firm of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, suggested that Revlon repurchase up to 5 million of its nearly 30
million outstanding shares and that the company adopt a notes purchase rights
plan as defensive maneuvers. Id. Both of Lipton's proposals were unanimously
adopted by the Revlon board. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The rights plan allowed shareholders to exchange each of their
shares for a $65 note that matured in one year with an interest rate of 12%o. Id.
The rights would trigger if anyone acquired 20% of the Revlon shares, unless a
purchaser acquired all the company's stock for cash at $65 or more per share.
Id. The purpose of the plan was to assure that the shareholders received $65 per
share should Revlon be taken over by another corporation. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1244 (Del. Ch. 1985),
aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
The rights plan employed by Household International in Moran was different from the one employed by Revlon. Two events could trigger the rights
under Household's rights plan, the announcement of a tender offer for 30% of
its shares by a party or the acquisition of 20% of its shares by a party, where as
only one event could trigger the rights under Revlon's rights plan. Moran, 500
A.2d at 1348-49. In addition, Household's rights triggered regardless of the
tender offer, whereas Revlon's rights would not trigger if the tender offer exceeded $65 per share. Id. For a discussion of the intricacies of Household's
rights plan, see supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
165. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 177. Pantry Pride also offered to acquire any and
all of Revlon's preferred shares at $26.67. Id.
166. Id. The security offered by Revlon consisted of a $47.50 note and onetenth of a share of preferred stock with a par value of $100.00. Id. Thus, the
value of this combined debt and equity security was $57.50. Id. Revlon only
offered its self-tender for 10 million of its 30 million issued and outstanding
shares. Id. The shareholders tendered well in excess of the 10 million shares
that Revlon offered to acquire. Id. Revlon acquired 10 million of the shares
offered on a pro rata basis. Id.
167. Id.
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unless Revability to incur additional debt, sell assets or pay dividends
168
action.
such
approved
directors
lon's independent
In response, Pantry Pride made several additional offers 16 9 which
Revlon resisted by announcing that it would enter into a leveraged
70
buyout agreement with another corporation, Forstmann Little & Co.'
The leveraged buyout agreement allowed each Revlon shareholder to
receive fifty-six dollars cash per share and allowed the current Revlon
directors to become twenty-five percent equity participants in the new
Revlon after the leveraged buyout. 171 The agreement also provided that
Revlon would nullify the covenants and rights made in connection with
the earlier Revlon offers. 172 The nullification of the covenants caused
the value of the notes issued in connection with the ten million shares to
in value, the noteholders
drop by 12.5%. 173 Because of this decrease
1 74
threatened to sue the Revlon directors.
Pantry Pride decided to stay in the bidding process and raised its
offer to fifty-six dollars and twenty-five cents per share.17 5 The Revlon
168. Id.
169. Id. After Revlon's self-tender, Pantry Pride made an offer of $42 per
share conditioned upon receipt of 90% of Revlon's shares. Id. Pantry Pride
indicated that it would consider purchasing less than 90%, at an increased price,
if Revlon removed the impending rights. Id. After this offer was rejected, Pantry Pride made offers of $50, $53, and $56.25 per share. Id. The offer of $56.25
per share was subject to the nullification of the rights plan, a waiver of the notes'
covenants and the election of three Pantry Pride directors to the Revlon board.
Id. at 178. Revlon rejected all of these offers. Id. at 177-78.
170. Id. at 178. Adler & Shaykin, Inc. and American Home Products, Inc.
agreed to aid Forstmann Little in financing the leveraged buyout. Id. If the
court had approved the leveraged buyout, Adler & Shaykin would have provided
almost one-half of the purchase price to Revlon by purchasing Revlon's beauty
care division for $905 million. Id. American Home Products would have
purchased two other divisions for $335 million. Id.
171. Id. Under the terms of the leveraged buyout agreement Revlon management would be entitled to purchase stock in the "new" Revlon by the exercise of their "golden parachutes." Id. The parachutes enabled the Revlon
directors to receive 25% of the equity in the "new" Revlon after the leveraged
buyout. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239,
1245, 1248 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
172. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. In return for Revlon's redemption of the
rights and waiver of the notes' covenants, Forstmann Little agreed to assume the
$475 million debt which Revlon had incurred as a result of its self-tender. Id.
173. Id. The notes, which originally traded near par at $100, dropped to as
low as $87, which represented a cumulative decline of about $60 million. Revlon,
501 A.2d at 1245.
174. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. The drop in the value caused some of the
noteholders to threaten suit against the directors for lifting the covenants on the
notes in connection with the Forstmann Little leveraged buyout agreement because the nullification of the covenants was the direct cause of the decline in
value of the notes. Id.
175. Id. Pantry Pride's offer was contingent on the revocation of the covenants made in connection with Revlon's self-tender, the rescission of the rights
plan, and the placement of three Pantry Pride directors on the Revlon board as
independent directors. Id.
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directors, who were concerned about the threatened suit by the noteholders as well as the threat from Pantry Pride, 176 persuaded Forstmann
Little to support the value of the notes 17 7 and increase its offer to fiftyseven dollars and twenty-five cents cash per share in exchange for additional consideration from Revlon.178 Revlon provided Forstmann Little
with a lock-up option that allowed it to purchase two of Revlon's divisions if any person or group acquired forty percent of Revlon's
shares 179 and a no-shop provision which prevented Revlon from entertaining any additional takeover bids.' 80 This agreement effectively
ended the ability of any third party to bid for Revlon. 18 1 Pantry Pride,
nonetheless, made a subsequent offer of fifty-eight dollars cash per
share conditioned upon the covenants, lock-up option and no-shop pro82
vision being revoked.'
The Revlon court began its analysis by noting that the business judgment rule, which imposes duties of loyalty and care on corporate directors, should be used to evaluate the appropriateness of a board's
decisions in response to a hostile takeover attempt.18 3 The court found
176. Id. at 182.
177. Id. at 178. In order to restore the value of the notes issued by Revlon,
Forstmann Little offered to exchange any of the Revlon notes for new notes
which it would issue with the same face value. Id. at 178-79. The decline in the
value of the notes had caused shareholders who had tendered their shares to
Revlon for the combined debt and equity securities to threaten suit against the
Revlon directors. Id. at 178.
178. Id. Prior to the increase in the offer price to $57.25 per share, representatives of Revlon, Forstmann Little and Pantry Pride met to determine
whether Revlon could be divided between Forstmann Little and Pantry Pride.
Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1245.
179. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. The "lock-up" option allowed Forstmann
Little to acquire Revlon's Vision Care and National Health Laboratories divisions for $525 million if anyone acquired 40% of Revlon's shares. Id. The option price was $100 to $175 million below the value ascribed to the divisions by
Lazard Fr~res. Id.
180. Id. In addition, the leveraged buyout agreement provided that Forstmann Little would receive a $25 million cancellation fee if the agreement terminated or if another acquiror obtained more than 19.9% of Revlon's stock. Id.
Unlike the prior agreement, this agreement would not provide the Revlon directors with an equity interest in the corporation after the merger. Id.
181. Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1249.
182. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179. In response to the defensive measures implemented by Revlon, Pantry Pride filed suit contesting the rights plan, the notes'
covenants and the leveraged buyout. Id. The Delaware Chancery Court found
that the Revlon directors breached their duty of loyalty by granting concessions
to Forstmann Little out of concern for their liability to the noteholders. Id. Accordingly, the Chancery Court prohibited any further transfer of assets to Forstmann under the leveraged buyout agreement, and enjoined the lock-up, noshop and cancellation fee provisions of the agreement. Id.
183. Id. The court stated that the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty which
directors owe to the corporation and its shareholders are the "bedrock" of the
law governing corporate takeovers. Id. The court went on to state that in order
for directors to enjoy the presumption that they acted appropriately under the
business judgment rule, the directors must first show that they made a good
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that the adoption of the rights plan after Pantry Pride first contacted
Revlon fell within the business judgment rule because it prevented Pantry Pride from acquiring Revlon at an unfair price and because its effect
was to promote the bidding process between Forstmann Little and Pantry Pride.' 84 The court also found that the self-tender was in the best
interest of the corporation since it stalled Pantry Pride from acquiring
8 5
Revlon at a then inadequate price.'
The Delaware Supreme Court's discussion of the legitimacy of the
lock-up option began with a caution that the measure was not to be evaluated according to the precepts used when evaluating other defensive
measures.18 6 Since Revlon employed the lock-up option in conjunction
with the leveraged buyout agreement, the court found that the Revlon
directors, necessarily, were resolved to the idea of selling the corporation. 187 Hence, the directors could no longer perform their role as fiduciaries of the shareholders by defending the corporation.' 8 8 The court
faith and reasonable investigation of the danger to corporate policy posed by the
takeover threat, and that the responsive action taken was reasonable in relation
to the threat posed. Id. at 180 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)).
184. Id. at 180. The Delaware Supreme Court found that when faced with
an offer to merge by a potential suitor, the business judgment rule requires a
target's directors to make a "good faith and reasonable investigation" as to
whether they should accept or oppose the offer. Id. (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985)). If the directors choose to
oppose the offer, they may only use those defensive measures which are reasonable in light of the threat posed to the target from an acquisition by the potential
suitor. Id. at 180-81. The court found that the Revlon board met the criteria set
out in Unocal when it employed the rights plan. Id. First, the court found that
the board acted on an informed basis when they decided to defend against Pantry Pride's takeover threat because the price offered was below the fair value of
the shares. Id. at 181. The court noted that Pantry Pride was a newcomer in the
takeover arena and would probably issue "junk bonds" for Revlon shares. Id. at
181-82. In light of this uncertainty about the quality of the securities that Pantry
Pride could offer, the court found that it was reasonable for the Revlon board to
implement the rights plan in order to protect their shareholders from being
forced to tender their shares for "junk bonds." Id. Second, the court found that
the rights plan did not impose any burden on the corporation which would make
other bidders shy away from attempting to acquire Revlon at a higher price. Id.
Thus, the rights plan was a reasonable defensive measure in light of the threat
posed by Pantry Pride's offer. Id.
185. Id. The court also analyzed the legitimacy of Revlon's self-tender. Id.
at 181. The court found that the Revlon board acted appropriately when it employed the self-tender after Pantry Pride extended an offer of $47.50 per share.
Id. The court found that the board appropriately determined that the offer was
inadequate after a reasonable investigation. Id.
186. Id. at 182. The court stated that the criteria for evaluating the lock-up
option were "significantly altered" because of the context in which the directors
used the option. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. By entering into the agreement with Forstmann Little, the Revlon
directors indicated that they intended to sell the corporation. Id. The directors
no longer intended to defend Revlon against an unfriendly acquisition and,
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stated that once the directors entered into the leveraged buyout agreement, their sole duty shifted to acting as auctioneers, with a duty to obtain the highest value that they could for the shares.' 8 9 The court also
stated that any action taken by the directors which inhibited the bidding
process would prevent the shareholders from obtaining the highest
value for the shares and, therefore, would breach the directors' fiduciary
duty.' 90 Since the lock-up option allowed Forstmann Little to acquire
two of Revlon's lucrative divisions, the court found that it stifled the
bidding process between Forstmann Little and Pantry Pride.191 The use
of the lock-up option, thus, was a breach of the Revlon directors' fiduci92
ary duty to its shareholders.'
The Revlon directors alleged that they acted appropriately by promoting the Forstmann Little agreement which contained the lock-up
provision since Forstmann Little was willing to guarantee the value of
the notes issued by Revlon.'93 The directors further alleged that under
Unocal, directors were permitted to consider the interests of constituencies, such as the noteholders, as well as the shareholders. 19 4 The court
rejected the directors' interpretation of Unocal, finding that while a
therefore, the criteria first developed in Unocal for evaluating defensive measures were no longer applicable. Id.
189. Id. The directors have a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders. Id. at 179. Since the directors were resolved to selling Revlon, the
directors could satisfy their duty to the shareholders only by obtaining the highest value for the Revlon shares. Id. at 182.
190. Id. The court also discussed the utility of a lock-up option in general.
Id. at 183. The court noted that a lock-up option is not per se illegal. Id. Such
options can be used to entice bidders to enter a contest for control of a corporation and, thus, bid up the value that the shareholders will receive for their
shares. Id. However, the use of lock-up options, as in the present case, to foreclose bidding between two corporations already engaged in a battle for control
of the target, operates to the disadvantage of the target's shareholders and, consequently, is a breach of the directors' duty of loyalty. Id. at 183-84 (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)).
191. Id. at 184. The court stated that the lock-up option "ended the auction" between Revlon and Pantry Pride. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 182. The Revlon directors also alleged that they had both a contractual duty under the agreements with the noteholders and a good faith obligation to sustain the value of the notes. Id. The court rejected this contention,
stating that no contractual provisions were violated. Id. In addition, the court
stated that the noteholders accepted the notes with the knowledge that the value
of the notes could fluctuate based upon market conditions. Id.
194. Id. In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that a board could
consider constituencies other than the shareholders when evaluating the threat
to a corporation from an impending takeover. Unocal, 491 A.2d at 955. In RevIon, the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed that such interests can be considered when evaluating a hostile takeover. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. However, the
court stated that such considerations are not appropriate when, as in Revlon, the
board was resolved to selling rather than maintaining the corporate enterprise.
Id. In this situation, the directors' sole goal must be to aid the shareholders by
obtaining the highest bid for the corporation's shares. Id.
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board can consider the interests of constituencies other than its shareholders, all actions taken by the directors must benefit the shareholders. 195 Although the lock-up option assured that Forstmann Little
would obtain Revlon and, thus, that the noteholders would be protected, it was to the detriment of the shareholders because it prevented
the bidding war between Forstmann Little and Pantry Pride from
96
continuing. 1
Finally, the Delaware Supreme Court considered the legitimacy of
the no-shop provision which was part of the leveraged buyout agreement with Forstmann Little.' 9 7 Noting that a no-shop provision is not
per se illegal,' 9 8 the court stated that a target could provide a white
knight with a no-shop provision if a hostile bidder's advances have an
adverse effect on the interests of the target's shareholders. 19 9 However,
in the present case, where the bidders made relatively similar offers, the
court stated that it was inappropriate for the directors to inhibit the bid20 0
ding process with the use of a no-shop provision.
V.

ANALYSIS

The introduction of new defenses to corporate takeovers has forced
20
courts to seek new ways of evaluating the legitimacy of such defenses. '
The Delaware Supreme Court, it is submitted, was correct when it recognized, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the need for a dynamic
corporate law by which to evaluate innovative attempts by directors to
ward off unwanted takeovers. 20 2 It is submitted that the early case law
governing takeovers provided too great a protection for directors who
employed defensive mechanisms since, in these early decisions, a plaintiff could be successful only if he could prove that the directors' "sole or
primary purpose" for a defensive maneuver was the perpetuation of
195. Id.
196. Id. The court stated forcefully that no interests other than those of the
shareholders can be considered when there is an active bidding process in progress. Id. The directors' sole motive must be to sell to the highest bidder. Id.
197. Id. at 184. The court found it ironic that Forstmann Little insisted on
a no-shop provision since Revlon was already dealing with Forstmann Little exclusively. Id.
198. Id. Although no-shop provisions are not per se illegal, the court stated
that they were never permissible where there is active bidding for a corporation
and the directors have a responsibility to act as auctioneers and obtain the highest bid. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court also upheld the trial court's decision
to block Forstmann Little from obtaining the $25 million cancellation fee which
was part of the second leveraged buyout agreement between Forstmann Little
and Revlon. Id.
201. For a list of the new defensive techniques and the cases which have
considered their legitimacy, see supra note 3.
202. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957. The Unocal court noted that corporate law
must adapt to and anticipate changes in the corporate world. Id.
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their own employment.20 3 Only after the plaintiff met this difficult test
would the courts consider whether the directors acted in good faith and
for a valid corporate purpose.2 0 4 It is suggested that this distribution of
the burden of proof is inconsistent with the theory that directors are to
act in the best interest of the shareholders.2 0 5 There are many actions,
it is submitted, which a director might take that may not be "solely or
primarily" for self-perpetuation, but which, nonetheless, are not in the
best interest of the corporation and its shareholders. 20 6 Such actions
would escape evaluation by the courts under the "sole or primary" purpose test because the plaintiffs would not be able to meet their initial
burden of proof.
Because the inherent possibility of self-perpetuation accompanies
any response by corporate directors to hostile takeover attempts, 20 7 it is
submitted that the Delaware Supreme Court acted appropriately in Unocal when it put the initial burden on the directors in a takeover setting to
prove that they acted in good faith,2 0 8 after reasonable investigation 20 9
203. For a list of those jurisdictions which have adopted the "sole or primary purpose" test, see supra note 39. It is submitted that most of these jurisdiction will not use this test in the future because of the attractiveness of the

Delaware Supreme Court's new formulation as set forth in Unocal.
204. See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.
1984) (plaintiff must make prima facie showing that directors had self-interest in
corporate transaction before burden shifts to directors to show that transaction
was fair and in best interest of corporation); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (to survive motion for summary judgment, plaintiff must
show that sole or primary purpose for directors' actions was to retain control),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
205. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch.
255, 270, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)) (directors have fiduciary duty to act in
best interest of corporation's shareholders). For a discussion of a director's fiduciary duty, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
206. For instance, directors might defend against a takeover in order to aid
a friend who is a supplier or a customer. The target's directors may also defend
against a takeover because of a personal dislike for the corporation which is trying to acquire the target. Additionally, although the target directors' sole or
primary motive may not be to retain their employment, it may be an important
reason for using a defensive technique. Takeovers which occurred for any of the
above stated reasons would go unchecked under the "sole or primary" purpose
test because the plaintiff could not meet his initial burden; namely, that selfperpetuation was the directors' sole or primary purpose for employing the defensive tactic.
207. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch.
494, 505, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (1964)) (in light of their inherent interest in
retaining control of corporation, directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that there would be danger to corporate policy if another
party acquired control of corporation).
208. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The Unocal court emphasized the inherent
conflict of interest which a director faces when deciding whether to defend
against a takeover attempt. Id. (quoting Bennett v. Propp., 41 Del. Ch. 14, 22,
187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962)). In light of this inherent conflict, the directors have
the initial burden of proving that they had reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to the policies of the corporation and the effectiveness of the corpora-
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and with the interests of the corporation and its shareholders as their
primary concern. 2 1 0 Additionally, under the Unocal formulation, the directors must show that the defensive measure employed was reasonable
in relation to the threat posed by the tender offeror. 2 1 It is only after
tion would exist if the raider owned a controlling interest in the corporation. Id.
(citing Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 505, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (1964)).
The court went on to state that this burden is satisfied "by showing goodfaith and
reasonable investigation." Id. (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506,
199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964)) (emphasis added).
The court noted that directors' ability to meet this burden is "materially
enhanced" where the defensive tactic is approved by a board with a majority of
independent directors who acted in good faith and after reasonable investigation. Id. (citing Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812, 815 (Del.
1984); Puma v. Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695 (Del. Ch. 1971)). For a discussion
of the importance of independent directors, see infra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
209. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. In Smith v. Van Gorkam, the Delaware

Supreme Court specifically addressed the requirement that directors act on an
informed basis in order to invoke the protection of the business judgment rule.
Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). The court found that
directors act on an informed basis if they "informed themselves 'prior to making
a business decision, of all material information reasonably available to them.' "
Id. at 872 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)). However,
it is relatively easy for directors to meet the burden of acting on an informed
basis, or put another way, of reasonable investigation. Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The directors can meet this burden by showing that
they did not act with gross negligence. Moran v. Household Int'l, 500 A.2d
1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). The Delaware courts have
offered multiple interpretations of "gross negligence" in the context of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722
(Del. 1971) ("fraud or gross overreaching"), rev g, 261 A.2d 911 (Del. Ch. 1969);
Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch.) (acting outside of "bounds
of reason and recklessly"), aff'd, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) (per curiam); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) ("bad faith ... or a gross
abuse of discretion"); Mitchell v. Highland-Western Glass Co., 19 Del. Ch. 326,
330, 167 A. 831, 833 (1933) (acting "so far without information that [the directors] can be said to have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment").
210. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The Delaware Supreme Court has held that
this criteria is met if the directors can show that their sole or primary reason for
taking the defensive measures was not self-perpetuation. Id.; Cheffv. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 504, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964). Courts have recognized that, in
fighting a tender offer, directors are necessarily promoting a self interest-their
continued employment. See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d 405, 409 (1962). Consequently, courts have stated that directors have a right to defend against a takeover so long as their primary purpose is to protect the corporation and its
shareholders, and not to perpetuate their own employment. Id. (restriction on
selective stock repurchase is that directors may not act solely or primarily out of
desire to perpetuate themselves in office).
For a discussion of the "sole or primary purpose" test, see supra notes 37-40
and accompanying text.
For a discussion of those jurisdictions which placed the burden on the plaintiff to show that the directors' "sole or primary" purpose was self-perpetuation,
see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
211. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. For a discussion of the new balancing ele-
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the directors make this initial showing that the new standard formulated
by the Delaware Supreme Court affords them the protection of the busi2
ness judgment rule.

12

It is submitted that placing the initial burden of proof on directors
is consistent with the purpose of the business judgment rule, namely, to
protect directors from liability for honest mistakes in judgment when
such judgments appeared reasonable at the time that they were
made. 213 It is submitted that a directorial decision can be considered
reasonable and, therefore, deserving of the protection of the business
judgment rule only after the directors show that their decision was made
in good faith, after reasonable investigation, and with a primary concern
2 14
for the interests of the shareholders and the corporation.
It is further submitted that balancing the severity of the defensive
measure against the threat posed by a raider is an appropriate factor to
2 15
inject into the considerations under the business judgment rule.
However, it is suggested that this balancing factor was rendered meaningless when applied by the court in Moran v. Household International,
ment which the Delaware Supreme Court introduced into its evaluation of defensive mechanisms under the business judgment rule, see supra notes 71 & 77

and accompanying text.
212. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
213. See, e.g., Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Say. and Loan, 749 F.2d 374,
377 (7th Cir. 1984) (under Illinois law, directors will not be held liable for mistake in judgment when they acted in good faith and without corrupt motive);
Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 506, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964) (directors will
not be punished for honest mistake in judgment).
214. When directors defend against a takeover, they are putting themselves
in a position in which their personal interest in continued employment with the
corporation could inhibit their ability to act in the best interest of the corporation. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277 (directors may have financial expectations
associated with defensive techniques); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (discussing
inherent conflict of interest in perpetuation of control). Many courts have labeled this as an inherent conflict of interest, because a director may have to
choose between what is best for himself and what is best for the corporation.
See, e.g., Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Because of this inherent conflict, it is submitted that directors should prove that they acted in good faith, after reasonable

investigation and with the interests of the corporation's shareholders as their
primary concern before they are afforded the protection of the business judgment rule.
215. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The Delaware Supreme Court first introduced the balancing element in Unocal. Id. It is submitted that, theoretically, the

balancing element is appropriate in the context of a takeover situation. It prevents a board of directors from implementing a defensive technique which has a
significant effect on the structure of the corporation when there is little or no
chance that the corporation would be acquired by another corporation. For instance, presumably a defensive maneuver which allows for the sale of the prize
assets of the corporation would not meet the balancing criteria if there is no
immediate threat of a takeover. However, such a defensive maneuver may meet
the balancing criteria if a raider is attempting to take over the corporation and
the court finds that it would be in the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders for the corporation to exist without its prize assets rather that to be
taken over by the raider.
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Inc.2 16 The Delaware Supreme Court, in Unocal, enunciated several factors for a court to consider in determining the threat posed. 2 "7 All of
these factors related to the threat of an imminent takeover by one partic2 19
ular raider. 2 18 In Moran, there was no imminent threat of a takeover.
The Moran court found, however, that the frequency of takeover attempts within the financial service industry provided a sufficient threat
to justify the rights plan adopted by the corporation's directors. 220 It is
submitted that by so doing, the Delaware Supreme court diluted the balancing factor which had been central to its decision in Unocal.22 1 Given
216. Moran, 500 A.2d 1346. For a discussion of the balancing test applied
in Moran, see supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
217. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. The Unocal court suggested that the court
consider: "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally),
the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities offered in the exchange." Id. (citing Lipton and Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibilities: An Update, A.B.A. National Institute on the Dynamics of Corporate
Control, December 8, 1983, at 7).
218. See id. at 955. Although the Delaware Supreme Court, in Unocal, did
not limit the constituencies that could be considered to those which it listed, it is
submitted that all of the factors which the court suggests have the common
thread of relating to a specific raider which is attempting to acquire the target.
See id.
219. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. The rights plan implemented by the Household board was strictly a preventive mechanism. Id. The plaintiff, a member of
the Household board, discussed a possible leveraged buyout with Household.
Id. However, it is uncontradicted that these talks did not progress beyond the
discussion stage. Id. For a discussion of the facts of Moran, see supra notes 90-95
and accompanying text.
220. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57.
221. It may, however, be that rather than nullifying the balancing test, the
Moran decision carried the test to its logical end. The balancing criterion weighs
the severity of the defensive maneuver against the probability of a takeover of
the target. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. Therefore, assuming that there is not a
significant threat of a takeover, it is more likely that a defensive maneuver which
has a minimal, as opposed to a dramatic, effect on the corporation will survive
the balancing test. The rights plan does not have the adverse effects on the
target corporation which other defensive maneuvers have. Moran, 500 A.2d at
1354. For instance, the rights plan does not require the target to pay out a large
sum of cash as "greenmail." Id. The rights plan also does not impair the financial structure of the target as does a "discretionary self-tender." Id. Thus, one
could argue that the Moran court did not disregard the balancing test, but rather
carried it to its logical end by finding that a defensive technique, such as the
rights plan, which has a minimal effect on the corporation, is acceptable when
there is not a great threat of a takeover.
Unfortunately, the Moran court spent little time discussing its rationale for
finding that the rights plan was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. Id. at
1356-57. The court simply stated that the increased frequency of takeovers in
the financial services industry and the concern about shareholders not receiving
adequate consideration for their shares justified the rights plan. Id. at 1357.
Thus, it is not known whether the court was carrying the balancing element to its
logical end.
It is further submitted that the effect of Moran on the balancing element may
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the prevalence of takeovers in almost every industry today, 22 2 it is submitted that the approach of the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran
would allow almost every corporation which implements a defensive
mechanism to satisfy the balancing element regardless of whether the
2 23
corporation was, in fact, presently the target of a takeover attempt.
Thus, while a corporation in a takeover-intense industry itself may not
be a desirable target for a takeover, 224 the Moran holding suggests that it
can implement a defensive mechanism simply because takeovers occur
frequently in the industry in which it operates. Such an approach, it is
submitted, negates the Delaware Supreme Court's original emphasis on
consideration of the imminency of the threat posed and enables a corporation to take steps which render it essentially "target-proof" even
2 25
though this might not be best for the corporation or its shareholders.
In addition to altering the burden of proof under the business judgment rule when used to evaluate defensive techniques employed by target directors, it is submitted that the Delaware Supreme Court correctly
226
placed a greater emphasis on the actions of independent directors.
The Second Circuit, while disagreeing as to the burden of proof allocanot be as great as anticipated because the court states that when the directors
are faced with a tender offer, they must evaluate the merits of the tender offer
and determine whether it is in the best interest of the corporation. Id. at 1354.
If the board finds that the tender offer is in the best interest of the corporation,
the directors must revoke the rights plan and allow the tender offer to proceed.
Id. Failure to do so would constitute a breach of the directors' duty of care. Id.
222. For a discussion of the dramatic increase in the number of takeovers
within all industries, see supra notes 1 & 2 and accompanying text.
223. In Moran, the court stated that the defensive technique was reasonable
in relation to the threat posed because of the increased frequency of takeovers in
the financial services industry. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357. There has been an
increased frequency of takeovers in almost every industry today. 1985 Profile,
MERGERS & AcquiSITIONS, May-June 1986, at 46-50. Thus, it is submitted that
corporations in almost any industry could implement a defensive maneuver and
satisfy the balancing criterion.
224. It is suggested that there are a number of reasons why a corporation
would not be a desirable target for a takeover. For instance, a corporation may
have little capital, a bad workforce, or outdated equipment.
225. Takeovers, it is submitted, often benefit a corporation and its shareholders. For instance, shareholders benefit from the dramatic increase in the
price of the target's stock which accompanies an impending takeover. See, e.g.,
Asquith, supra note 14, at 81 (price of target's stock increases dramatically after
takeover bid is announced). In addition, a corporation may increase its productivity by merging with a supplier or customer or by merging with a corporation
that has excellent management. See, e.g., S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON &J. MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at 417 (merger with supplier or customer assures uninterrupted access to raw material or market outlets); E. KINTNER, supra note 2, at 1819 (highly trained, experienced managers can develop sound corporate programs which will increase profitability).
226. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (directors' ability to meet their initial burden of proof is "materially enhanced" where majority of board which approved
defensive maneuver comprised independent directors who acted in good faith
and after reasonable investigation); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 959-65 (Del. 1985) (same).
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tion in takeover cases, 22 7 joined the Delaware Supreme Court in this
increased emphasis on the actions of independent directors. 228 It is
submitted that both courts would be reluctant to find that a defensive
technique was not in the best interest of the target and its shareholders
if the independent directors concurred in good faith with the implementation of the defensive technique after making a reasonable investigation. Since these independent directors are relatively free from the
conflict of interest under which managerial directors labor in the takeover context, 22 9 it is submitted that their decision should necessarily be
accorded a greater presumption of validity.
The major concern which courts have when evaluating a defensive
maneuver employed by a target's directors is the possibility that the directors have used the defensive maneuver solely to assure their continued employment. 230 It is submitted that this concern is more warranted
with managerial directors than it is with independent directors. Unlike
independent directors, managerial directors usually depend upon their
position with the target as a primary source of income. 23 1 A successful
takeover by a tender offeror necessarily would have a significant economic toll on managerial directors who probably would lose their
jobs.

23 2

Furthermore, managerial directors are intimately involved in the
227. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d
Cir. 1986) (under New York law, directors enjoy presumption of propriety). For
a discussion of the Second Circuit's recognition that different burdens of proof
are placed on directors under the business judgment rule in Delaware and New
York, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
228. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277. The Second Circuit found that independent directors have an important duty to protect shareholders in a takeover battle when the managerial directors are financially involved in the tender
offer. Id. In Hanson Trust, the managerial directors had a 15% equity interest in
the leveraged buyout which was used to fend off an unwelcome tender offer. Id.
The Second Circuit emphasized that when managerial directors have an interest

in the defensive mechanism employed, independent directors must carefully review the defensive mechanism suggested by managerial directors to assure that
it is in the best interest of the shareholders. Id.
229. For a discussion of the difference between managerial and independent directors in a takeover context, see infra notes 230-37.
230. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180 (Del. 1986) (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc., 493 A.2d
946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) (when board employs defensive maneuver, there arises
"the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interest, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders"). For a discussion of the directors' potential conflict of interest when employing a defensive
tactic, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
231. Managerial directors generally are the most highly paid individuals in
a corporation. C. PECK, Top EXECUTIvE COMPENSATION: 1987 Edition 6-7. Empirical evidence shows that executives' income increases proportionately with an
increase in sales by the corporation. Id. at 7 Exhibit 1.
232. For a discussion of the impact on managerial directors resulting from
a takeover, see supra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
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daily operations of the corporation. 238 Very often, these directors have
actively participated in the growth of the corporation and have set goals
which they wish the corporation to achieve. 23 4 In light of the efforts
they have expended, these directors will be naturally reluctant to turn
over control of the corporation. Thus, it is submitted that, because of
managerial directors' active participation in the corporation and their
potential loss of employment, the courts are correct in strictly scrutinizing the ability of managerial directors to evaluate objectively the value of
23 5
a tender offer to their corporation and its shareholders.
Independent directors, on the other hand, are removed from the
daily operations of the corporation and do not rely on their positions on
the board as sources of income. 23 6 Accordingly, it is submitted that independent directors are better able to safeguard the interests of share23 7
holders by objectively evaluating the merits of a tender offer.

233. Werner, CorporationLaw in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L.

REV.

1611,

1654 (1981) (noting that inside directors are truly the managers of corporations,
and that independent directors are not able to manage as they spend only a
small part of their time on corporate business).
234. Id.
235. Because of the possibility that managerial directors implement defensive measures for their own benefit, the Delaware Supreme Court puts the initial
burden of proof in a takeover situation on the directors. See, e.g., Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) (directors must show
that they acted in good faith and after reasonable investigation before they may
invoke protection of business judgment rule); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (same). Judge Oakes, in his concurring
opinion in Hanson Trust, further argued that when directors of a corporation are
involved in a management-participation leveraged buyout that involves a lockup option, such arrangements warrant strict scrutiny. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at
284 (Oakes,J., concurring). Judge Oakes suggested that a court must determine
whether the gain to the shareholders from the lock-up option outweighs the loss
to the shareholders from the cessation of the bidding process for the corporation which often results from a lock-up option. Id. The only time when a court
has found a lock-up option to benefit the shareholders is when it advances the
bidding process by inducing a prospective bidder to compete for control of the
target. Thomas v. Enstar Corp., Nos. 7641, 7643 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 1984), reprinted in 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 822 (1984).
236. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundationsand
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. vol. 3, 83, 99

n.52 (salary is secondary consideration for independent director when deciding
whether to accept position on board). In proportion to their annual income, the
salary independent directors receive for sitting on a board is minimal. Id. at 93
n.52. For instance, in 1981 the average salary an independent director received
for sitting on a board was approximately $21,000. J. BACON, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP PRACTICES: COMPENSATION, THE CONFERENCE BOARD REPT. No. 815, at
1 (1981). For the same period, the average annual cash income of newly-named
directors was $280,000, over ten times the compensation of an independent director. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, DIRECTOR DATA 8 (1982).
237. Commentators have suggested a "monitoring model" for corporate

governance. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structures in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375, 403-16 (1975)

(leading proponent of this theory suggests that board comprised of all or a majority of independent directors should monitor actions of chief executive officer
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Although the Delaware Supreme Court and the Second Circuit
agree on the importance of decisions by independent directors, they differ on the interaction of such decisions with the business judgment rule.
The Delaware Supreme Court stated that a good faith decision by independent directors to employ a defensive maneuver after reasonable
investigation materially enhances the board's ability to meet its initial
burden of proof.23 8 The Second Circuit found that the initial burden of

proof continues to be on the plaintiff under New York law. 23 9 However,
the Second Circuit, it is suggested, relies heavily upon the independent
directors to protect the interests of shareholders when managerial direc240
tors are involved financially in the defensive technique.
and other management). Under this model, independent directors would restrict managerial power and would assure that it is exercised in the best interest
of the shareholders. Id. at 404. The "monitoring model" has been heavily criticized because of its failure to recognize the intraworkings of modern boards.
For instance, independent directors are often selected by the chief executive officer. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and Corporate Law,
80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21 (1981). In addition, independent directors are
often friends and social acquaintances of the chief executive or from
the upper echelons of companies and professional firms patronized by
or otherwise economically concerned with the corporation. These social and professional connections may overlap; regionally or nationally,
the elites who do business together also work for the same community
and charitable organizations, belong to the same social clubs, and even
relax at the same camps.
Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-FaintPromise?,
76 MICH. L. REV. 581, 584-85 (1978); see also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 236,

at 91 (independent directors generally have compatible personalities with management and accept the corporation's goals and methods of operation). In light
of the close unity between the management and the independent directors, it is

natural for independent directors to be deferential to management decisions,
rather than to scrutinize the decisions. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 236, at 91;
see also Solomon, supra, at 77 (independent directors are "sympathetic listeners

rather than determined inquisitors").
238. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
239. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 273 ("under New York law, the initial
burden of proving directors' breach of fiduciary duty rests with the plaintiff").
240. Id. at 277. In Hanson Trust SCM's board delegated broad authority to
the managing directors to structure a leveraged buyout with Merrill Lynch. Id.
The Second Circuit recognized that such delegation was common. Id. However,
the normal post hoc review by the board of the managing directors proposal is not
sufficient where, as here, the managing directors have an interest in the proposed leveraged buyout. Id. The court found that because the managing directors had a 15% equity interest in the leveraged buyout, the independent
directors should have taken some steps to indicate that they exercised due care.
Id. (citing Treadway Cos., v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The Second Circuit added that, in Treadway, it had suggested some actions
which, if taken by the independent directors, would indicate that they acted with
due care. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 384 (2d Cir. 1980).
The directors could employ an investment banking firm to evaluate the leveraged buyout agreement and issue a "fairness" opinion, indicating that the agreement is fair to the target and its shareholders. Id. It is common for independent
directors to take such action when managing directors are involved in the leveraged buyout. Daitz, Kaufman, Ley & Messineo, Leveraged Buy-Outs, ACQUISITIONS
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Although it is suggested that the Delaware Supreme Court justifiably emphasized the importance of independent directors, it is further
suggested that the same court, in Moran, disregarded a literal interpretation of the Delaware Corporate code. Section 157 of the Corporate
Code provides that a corporation can issue rights "entitling holders to
purchase from the corporation of any shares of its capital stock."'2 4 1 The
rights plan in Moran provided the shareholders of Household International with a "right" which allowed them to purchase shares in any corporation which might take over Household International at one-half of
the market value of the tender offeror's shares. 2 42 In effect, the court
gave the directors of one corporation, Household, the power to shape
the financial structure of another corporation, the potential tender offeror.2 43 It is suggested that this violates the clear import of the statute
which only allows a corporation to issue rights to purchase "its [own]
shares." 24 4 The Delaware Supreme Court did not address this argument, 245 preferring to analogize the rights plan to an "anti-dilution"
clause which it had found to be legitimate in the past.2 4 6 While the
1985, 143, 160. Directors could also obtain information on the
effect of the proposed action. Treadway, 638 F.2d at 384. Directors should become fully informed on the nature of the proposed action and should spend
sufficient time deliberating so as to be sure that the action taken is fair to the
AND MERGERS

corporation and its shareholders. Id.

In Hanson Trust, the Second Circuit found that the directors retained a law
firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, to advise them as to the merits of the
leveraged buyout. The directors, however, did not obtain sufficient information
to evaluate the leveraged buyout, nor did they adequately consider the information which they did obtain. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 277. Thus, the court found
that the board did not exercise due care. Id.
241. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 157 (1983) (emphasis added). For the text of

§ 157, see supra note 98.
242. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. For a discussion of the rights plan, see supra
notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
243. By allowing a target corporation to employ a rights plan, it is submitted that the Moran court is allowing the target to control the financial composition of the raider after a successful takeover. If the target's shareholders are
able to acquire shares of the raider at a reduced rate, then the raider will not
receive an influx of capital which is commensurate with the number of shares
that it sells to the target's shareholders. Thus, the raider will not have as much
working capital as it would have had if the target's shareholders acquired shares
at the fair market value. In addition, the original shareholders of the raider will
have to share the amount of money allocated to dividends with the new shareholders who did not make a similar investment in the corporation.
244. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157. For the text of § 157, see supra note 98.
245. 500 A.2d at 1353. For a discussion of the court's failure to consider
this argument, see supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
246. Id. An anti-destruction or anti-dilution provision is designed to preserve the value of a conversion privilege against diminution by directorial actions. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 943 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981). A conversion privilege allows the holder of a corporate
security to exchange his security for another security of the same corporation.
Id. at 942. Generally, a holder converts debentures into shares of stock. Id.
Thus, should corporation A merge into corporation B, and the merger agree-
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court cited three cases to support this contention,2 4 7 none of these cases
considered whether an "anti-dilution" clause is lawful under section
157.248 Consequently, no court has evaluated the legitimacy of a rights
plan or an "anti-dilution" clause under section 157.
Finally, it is submitted that a lock-up option2 49 will not be adopted
ment provide for corporation B to give the shareholders of corporation A shares
of stock in corporation B in exchange for their shares in corporation A, the right

of conversion under an anti-dilution provision will survive a merger. See, e.g., id.
at 943; Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 939 (Del. 1979). Consequently, a debenture holder in corporation A can exchange his debentures for
shares in corporation A and then receive shares in corporation B as provided for
in the merger agreement.
It is submitted that an anti-dilution provision is not analogous to a rights
plan and that a rights plan imposes a much greater burden on the acquiring

corporation in a takeover than does the anti-dilution provision on the surviving
corporation in a merger. An anti-dilution provision allows the holder of a security, at the time of merger, to exercise a pre-existing right. That is, the provision
allows the holder to exchange his securities for another type of security in the
same corporation and receive the benefits afforded to the second type of security
in the merger. A fights plan, it is suggested, rather than preserving a pre-existing right, creates a new right. The plan allows the shareholders of the target
to purchase shares in the tender offeror at a reduced rate, not simply exchange
one type of the target's securities for another type. Thus, it is submitted that the
rights plan is not analogous to an anti-dilution provision.
Further, it is submitted that the rights plan should not enjoy the same protection as anti-dilution provisions because it allows the directors of one corporation unilaterally to provide its shareholders rights in another corporation. Antidilution provisions simply allow security holders in the target to exercise their
preexisting right to exchange their securities for another type of security issued
by the target. Then, upon the joint agreement of both corporations involved in
the merger, people holding the latter type of security can exchange their securities for securities in the acquiring corporation.
247. 500 A.2d at 1352 (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929,
946 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981); Wood v. Coastal States Gas
Corp., 401 A.2d 932, 937-39 (Del. 1979); B.S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
204 A.2d 746, 750-51 (Del. 1964)).
248. See Board v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981); Wood v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 401 A.2d 932 (Del.
1979); B.S.F. Co. v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 204 A.2d 746 (1969).
The plaintiffs contended that § 157 of the Corporate Code does not permit
the issuance of rights to purchase the shares of a corporation other than the one
that issued the right. The court avoided this argument by analogizing the rights
plan to an anti-dilution provision. It is submitted that this does not answer the
plaintiff's contention that the rights plan is invalid under § 157 because none of
the cases cited determined whether an anti-dilution provision is legitimate under
§ 157.
Consequently, the Delaware Supreme Court has never explicitly determined
whether a rights plan or anti-dilution provision is inconsistent with a literal reading of § 157. For a criticism of the view that the rights plan is analogous to an
anti-dilution provision, see supra note 246 and accompanying text. For the text
of § 157, see supra note 98.
249. There are generally three types of lock-up options. First, a target may
grant a white knight the option to purchase valuable assets of the target if the
target is taken over by another party or a target simply may sell valuable assets
to a white knight. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781
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by directors in the future because of its limited utility.2 50 Directors
often use a lock-up option as a means of enticing a corporation or
"white knight" to acquire a target so that the target can avoid being
taken over by an undesirable suitor. 25

1

The use of the lock-up option

F.2d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 1986) (SCM defended against acquisition by Hanson
Trust by offering Merrill Lynch lock-up option on two lucrative divisions); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986)
(one of defensive maneuvers employed by Revlon to avoid acquisition by Pantry
Pride was to give Forstmann Little lock-up option on two of its profitable divisions). Second, a target may issue treasury shares to a white knight to help block
a hostile tender offer. Nelson, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.-The Decision
and Its Implicationsfor Future Tender Offers, 7 CORP. L. REV. 233, 265 (1984). Third,
a white knight may obtain a lock-up voting agreement under which it will receive
the voting rights of a large block of shares. Id. at 267. Such an arrangement will
prevent a hostile tender offeror from acquiring the target because the hostile
tender offeror will not be able to obtain a controlling interest in the target without obtaining the shares over which the white knight has the voting rights. Id.
250. The Delaware Court of Chancery approved the use of a lock-up provision as a defensive tactic in Thompson v. Enstar Corp., Nos. 7641, 7643 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 16, 1984), reprinted in 9 DEL.J. CORP. L. 822 (1984). In Enstar, a shareholder was attempting to wage a proxy fight at an upcoming shareholder meeting, seeking to elect his slate of directors. Id., slip op. at 2. In response to a
perception that the shareholder would win the proxy fight, the directors attempted to sell the assets of the corporation before the meeting. Id. The court
found that the entire board agreed that it was in the best interest of the corporation for the directors to sell the assets. Id. The court found that there was only
one bidder for the assets of the corporation and that the bidder would not follow
through with the acquisition unless the corporation would enter into a lock-up
provision which gave it voting control of the target. Id., slip op. at 8. The court
then found that the lock-up provision was appropriate under the business judgment rule since it promoted the bidding process by assuring that the only bidder
continued its pursuit to acquire the target. Id. Only in this very limited situation, where the lock-up provision promotes the bidding process, will courts approve use of a lock-up provision. Id. See also Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281
(directors actions must redound for benefit of corporation and its shareholders);
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183 (lock-up options which draw bidders into takeover battle
benefit shareholders and, therefore, are valid).
251. Courts have stated that a lock-up option withstands analysis under the
business judgment rule only if it encourages or stimulates the bidding process.
Revlon, 501 A.2d at 1250. It is submitted that the only time when a lock-up
option can encourage the bidding process is if there is only one bidder. If there
is more than one bidder and the target gives a lock-up option to one of the
bidders, the other bidders will probably become discouraged and not continue
to bid up the value of the target's shares in light of the valuable assets which the
one bidder will receive under the lock-up option if one of the other bidders
successfully acquires the target. See Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281 (lock-up option is suspected to foreclose bidding).
If there are multiple bidders and the option is made at a fair price, one
commentator suggests that bidders should not be deterred from continuing to
bid because if they acquire the target, they will receive adequate compensation
for the assets that are sold. Nelson, supra note 246, at 267. It is submitted that
this argument fails because normally the assets involved in the lock-up option
are very lucrative. Thus, it is submitted that the other bidders inevitably will find
that the option price is not fair. In addition, it is submitted that this commentator ignores the fact that takeovers are often sought to acquire specific assets and
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often will stifle the bidding process between the undesirable suitor and
the white knight because the undesirable suitor will find the target less
attractive after the white knight has an option to purchase valuable assets of the tender offeror. If directors are resolved to selling the target,
the business judgment rule imposes a duty upon the directors to take
steps directed only at obtaining the maximum value for the shareholders' stock. 25 2 As the implementation of a lock-up option will often discourage a potential bidder, namely the undesirable suitor, from
increasing its bid, the shareholders will not receive the maximum value
possible for their shares. 25 3 Accordingly, a lock-up option often creates
a result contrary to that which the directors have a duty to seek. It is,
therefore, submitted that it will not be employed widely in the future.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Consistently more ingenious defensive measures are being adopted
2 54
by directors attempting to combat the continued threat of takeovers.
The recent proclamations from the Delaware Supreme Court indicate
that the rights plan in Moran and the discretionary self-tender in Unocal
are two types of defense mechanisms which have survived scrutiny
2 53
under the business judgment rule and will be employed in the future.
However, the rights plan seems more attractive because it does not impose an enormous debt on the target, as does the self-tender, if the defensive mechanism is triggered. 256 Thus, it is submitted that the rights
the capital which the target obtains from the sale of those assets may not be as
attractive as the assets themselves.
252. Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281 (loCk-up option may not deter bidding);
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (obtaining highest price for stock should be "central
theme" guiding director action).
253. See, e.g., Hanson Trust, 781 F.2d at 281 (lock-up option ended bidding);
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183 (lock-up option had destructive effect on auction process). In Hanson Trust, the directors of SCM implemented the lock-up option in
order to discourage Hanson Trust from attempting to acquire SCM. Hanson
Trust, 781 F.2d at 270. In Revlon, the directors of Revlon gave Forstmann Little
a lock-up option in order to discourage Pantry Pride from attempting to acquire
Revlon. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178.
254. For a discussion of the types of defenses which corporations have employed, see supra note 3.
255. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1357 (Delaware Supreme Court approved rights
plan); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957 (Delaware Supreme Court approved discretionary
self-tender).
256. A discretionary self-tender requires the target to incur enormous debt
when it exchanges debt securities for the shares of stock owned by its shareholders. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950. For instance, in Unocal, the target incurred $6.1 to
$6.5 billion in additional debt as a result of the self-tender. Id. The rights plan,
on the other hand, gives rights to the target's shareholders if there is a takeover.
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. Such a plan does not alter the financial structure of
the target by requiring it to incur large debts. Id. at 1354. Consequently, it is
submitted that corporations will find it to be a very attractive means of guarding
against a takeover. This is especially true if other jurisdictions follow the Delaware Supreme Court's finding in Moran that rights plans can be implemented
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plan is destined to be the safe harbor for targets in the current storm of
25 7
tender offers.
Brian D. Wenger
even though there are not corporations which are currently attempting to acquire the target. Id. at 1350, 1357.
257. As a result of the Delaware Supreme Court's approval of the rights
plan in Moran, several corporations in the last quarter of 1985 and the first quarter of 1986 have implemented a similar poison pill defense. New Guisefor Poison
Pill, MERGERS & AcQuISITIONS, July-August 1986, at 21 (noting that several corporations installed poison pills after Moran decision came out on November 19,
1985, including Burroughs Corp. (now "Unisys" after acquiring Sperry), Pillsbury Co. and Ryder Systems); Proliferation of Poison Pills, MERGERS & AcQuIsiTIONS, March-April 1986, at 23 (noting increase in poison pills in the last quarter
of 1985 resulting from the Moran decisions).
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